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Abstract 
―Unity in Diversity‖ was the fortunate motto of the otherwise unfortunate Draft Constitutional 
Treaty. The motto did not make it into the Treaty of Lisbon. It deserves to be kept alive in a 
new  constitutional  perspective,  namely  the  re-conceptualisation  of  European  law  as  new 
type  of  conflicts  law.  The  new  type  of  conflicts  law  which  the  paper  advocates  is  not 
concerned  with  selecting  the  proper  legal  system  in  cases  with  connections  to  various 
jurisdictions. It is instead meant to respond to the increasing interdependence of formerly 
more autonomous legal orders and to the democracy failure of constitutional states which 
result from the external effects of their laws and legal decisions on non-nationals. European 
has many means to compensate these shortcomings. It can derive its legitimacy from that 
compensatory potential without developing federal aspirations.  
The paper illustrates this approach with the help of two topical examples. The first is the 
conflict between European economic freedoms and national industrial relations (collective 
labour) law. The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ in Viking, Laval, and Rüffert in which the 
Court established the supremacy of the freedoms over national labour law is criticised as a 
counter-productive deepening of Europe‘s constitutional asymmetry and its social deficit. The 
second  example  from  environmental  law  concerns  the  conflict  between  Austria  and  the 
Czech Republic over the Temelin nuclear power pant. The paper criticises the reasoning of 
the ECJ, but does not suggest an alternative outcome to the one the Court has reached. 
The introductory and the concluding sections generalise the perspectives of the conflicts-law 
approach.  The  introductory  section  takes  issue  with  max  Weber‘s  national  state.  The 
concluding section suggests a three-dimensional differentiation of the approach which seeks 
to respond to the need for transnational regulation and governance. 
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Preliminary Remarks 
―Unity in Diversity‖ was the fortunate motto of the otherwise unfortunate Draft Constitutional 
Treaty.1 This motto deserves to be kept alive, despite, or even because of, this failure and 
the retreat of European politics from overt constitutional ambitions. It is even safe to say that, 
precisely  through  these  failures,  the  need  to  come  to  grips  with  the  challenges  that  it 
articulates have become more obvious. The core problem from which this essay departs can 
be simply stated: the Member States of the European Union are no longer autonomous. 
They are, in many ways, inter-dependent and hence depend upon co-operation. However, 
Europe has not transformed into a federation and it cannot become a federation as long as 
its constituent actors do not agree to the federal vision. Should we, nevertheless, keep the 
federal perspective alive? The reaction to this question cannot be uniform. In view of the 
histories  of  European  democracies,  their  uneven  potential  and/or  willingness  to  pursue 
objectives of distributional justice, to respond to economic and financial instabilities, and to 
cope  with  environmental  challenges,  differentiating  answers  suggest  themselves.  ―Social 
Europe‖ is probably the most delicate among these challenges, as long as it remains, at 
best, unclear whether and, if so, how, a European federation might respect and re-construct 
the  embeddedness  of  Europe‘s  welfare  state  traditions.  This  example  is  by  no  means 
exceptional. The sustainability of the whole European project seems to depend upon the 
construction and institutionalization of a ―third way‖ between or beyond the defense of the 
nation state, on the one hand, and federalist ambitions, on the other. This essay will explore 
the potential of the conflicts law approach to provide perspectives within which this challenge 
can be met. 
This is not only an immodest, if not overly ambitious suggestion, and also one which must 
not be misunderstood as a sceptic retreat from the European project. As a precautionary 
move, the first section will recall a classical address of Max Weber‘s. It will use this reference 
to re-construct the lasting merits and accomplishments of the integration project. It will also, 
in the same Section II, address the legitimacy problématique of  this project‘s institutional 
design and discuss three significant theoretical efforts of the foundational period to cope with 
this challenge. The following Section III will analyse the responses of these three theories to 
the  post-foundational  dynamics  of  the  integration  project.  Arguing  that  all  three  of  these 
traditions realise an exhaustion of their potential to cope with Europe‘s present challenges, 
Section IV will present the conflicts law approach as an alternative response to Europe‘s 
legitimacy  problématique.  Two  follow-up  sections,  one  on  the  recent  labour  law 
jurisprudence of the ECJ (Section V), the other on its response to the conflict between the 
Czech Republic and Austria on atomic energy (Section VI), will illustrate the operation of the 
conflicts  law  approach.  The  concluding  Section  VII  will  summarise  its  problems  and 
perspectives. 
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I.   Max Weber’s Nation State 
Back in 1895, Max Weber gave his inaugural address in the University of Freiburg,  then 
situated  in  Bismarck‘s  Kaiserreich  of  1871.  The  address  was  published  in  an  enlarged 
version under the title ―The National State and Economic Policy‖.
2 It became a real classic 
and has now regained a fascinating topicality for two reasons. The first concerns the object 
of  the  field  study  which  Weber  used  to  explain  some  of  his  more  abstract  theoretical 
positions  and  provocative  political  views. The  field  study  dealt  with  the  reasons  for,  and 
implications of, the migration of workers. The analysis which Weber delivered excels through 
a  precision  and  subtlety  which  is  difficult  to  find  in  the  current  debates,  at  least  in  legal 
quarters. However, Weber also used this case to explain and defend a vision of the political 
and economic commitments of the nation state, which is, at best, a contrast to the European 
vocation – but is, nevertheless, at least negatively instructive because it helps us to realise to 
what degree this vision is still alive in contemporary debates and legal arguments.
3 
Weber  drew  upon  the  empirical  work  which  he  had  undertaken  in  1892,  wh ile  still  a 
Pivatdozent  in  Berlin,  in  the  context  of  a  major  Enquète  of  the  Verein  für  Sozialpolitik 
(Association for Social Reform) on the situation of the agrarian work force in the German 
Reich.  He  had  focused  there  on  ―the  posting  of  workers‖  from  Poland  to  the  Prussian 
Province of West-Prussia. His multi-faceted analysis addressed the transformation of pre-
modern  patriarchal  structures  into  a  capitalist  agrarian  economy,  identified  the  pressures 
which this processes exerted on the landowners, described the incentive structure which 
fostered the import of ―cheap labour‖ from the neighbouring regions of Poland and from the 
deeper East Galicia.
4 The capability of the Poles to endure the poor working conditions and 
the social situation in the new agrarian e conomy, so Weber observed, was fostering the 
gradual increase of the Polish and the decrease of the German share. The great theorist of 
occidental rationalism felt deeply irritated. Weber expressed his concern about the decline of 
―Germanness‖ (Deutschtum) in West Prussia. And, equally irritating in EU-perspectives, he 
called for corrective state measures: a closure of the borders to migrating workers, and the 
purchase of land by the state. 
Even more irritating, however, is what he submits as his ―subjective‖ position – the value 
judgements nurturing his political advice. 
And the nation State is for us not an indefinite something that one feels one can place all the 
higher  the  more  its  essence  is  shrouded  in  mystical  gloom,  but  the  worldly  power 
organisation of the nation, and in this nation State is raison d’état for us, the ultimate value 
                                                       
2 Der Nationalstaat und die Volkswirtschaftspolitik, (Freiburg i.Br.: C.A. Wagner, 1895) [citations here are from Ben 
Fowkes‘ translation in (1980) 9 Economy and Society, pp. 420-449]. 
3 See the example of the Austrian Oberster Gerichtshof discussed in Section VI.2.1 infra. 
4 See the reconstruction of Weber‘s analysis of the underlying transformation processes by Ola Ageval, ―Science, 
Values, and the Empirical Argument in Max Weber‘s Inaugural Address‖, (2004) 4 Max Weber Studies, pp. 157-177. I H S — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — 3 
 
criterion  on  economic  considerations  too.  It  does  not  mean  to  us,  as  a  strange 
misunderstanding  believes:  ‗state  assistance‘  instead  of  ‗self-help‘,  national  regulation  of 
economic life instead of the free play of economic forces, but we want through this slogan to 
raise the demand that for questions  of German national economic policy  – including  the 
question whether and how far the State should interfere in economic life or whether and 
when it ought instead to set the nation‘s economic forces free to develop themselves and 
tear down restraints on them – in the individual case the last and decisive vote ought to go to 
the economic and political power interests of our nation, and its bearer, the German State.
5 
Strong words, indeed. Even Weber‘s audience in Freiburg was apparently upset and Weber 
distanced  himself  later  from  this  strong  language.
6  What  motivated  his  polemic?  Rita 
Aldenhoff, in her very instructive comments on t he address, starts her analysis with a 
quotation  from  Weber‘s  contribution  to  the  Verhandlungen  des  5.  Evangelisch-sozialen 
Kongresses held in Frankfurt in 1894. There, Weber had stated his normative premises quite 
succinctly: 
We do want … to shape the conditions of life in a way that makes people feel good, but such 
that, under the pressures of the unavoidable struggle for life, the best in the, the physical and 
psychological qualities that we want to save for our nation, will be preserved. Well … these 
are value-judgments and they are changeable. Anyway, there is an irrational element. 
Is this a pure nationalist talking? ―Germanness‖, as defined, can neither be understood as 
some  form  of  brutal  nationalism;  nor  does  it  have  anything  in  common  with  the  homo 
economicus, as we know him from mainstream economic theorising. Weber‘s homini are real 
human beings; he exposes them to demands of a different quality. What is, at any rate, 
noteworthy is the care which Weber takes to differentiate between theoretical, economic, 
and  the  political  orientations  which  should  in  his  view  inform  the  Volkswirtschaftspolitik 
(economic  policy-making).  When  he  diagnoses  the  readiness  of  migrant  workers  from 
Poland  to  accept  the  hardships  of  their  new  existence  in  the  ―host  state‖,  he  is,  in  fact, 
describing  what  we  would  call  a  ―race  to  the  bottom‖  and  questioning  precisely  the 
―willingness  to  starve  the  most‖  as  the  underlying  mechanism.
7  There  is  a  very  critical 
dimension  in  Weber‘s  position,  in  that  he  rejects  any  claim  to  ―objective  validity‖  of 
arguments  presented  in  the  name  of  economics;  such  arguments  tend  to  camouflage 
normative  judgements  and  political  choices  –  a  cardinal  sin  in  the  eyes  of  Weber‘s 
epistemology. This is not to defend the substance of Weber‘s pronouncements. We have 
reasons  to  remain  irritated  when  reading  about  the  ―role  played  by  physical  and 
                                                       
5 The translation is not taken from the source in note 2 but was done by Iain F. Fraser, Florence. 
6 See Max Weber‘s letter to his brother Alfred, cited in Rita Aldenhoff-Hübinger, ―Max Weber‘s Inaugural Address of 
1895 in the Context of the Contemporary Debates in Political Economy‖, (2004) 4 Max Weber Studies, pp. 143-156, 
at 146 note 8. 
7 See Ola Agevall, ibid. (note 4), p. 174. 4 — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — I H S 
 
 
psychological racial differences between nationalities [sic!] in their struggle for existence‖.
8 
But  Rita  Aldenhoff‘s  reference  to  Weber‘s  trans-economic  Menschenbild  is  a  stringent 
defence of Weber the methodologist against Weber‘s political polemics. The methodologist 
remains of great topicality in his critique of spurious claims, not only of the historical school, 
but also of neo-classical economics
9 – and their negligent contemporary use in misguiding 
rationalisations of the integration project as a whole and so many of its segments. 
                                                       
8 This opening statement of the inaugural address is a core reference in the debates on Weber‘s nationalism; see, 
for example, Karl Palonen, ―Was Max Weber a ‗Nationalist‘? A Study in the Rhetoric of Conceptual Change, (2001) 1 
Max  Weber  Studies,  pp.  196-214.  Weber‘s  nationalism  and  his  political  interventions  have  later  nurtured  the 
suspicion of a liaison dangereuse with Carl Schmitt (see Kjell Ebelbrekt, ―What Carl Schmitt picked up in Weber‘s 
Seminar: A Historical Controversy Revisited‖, (2009) 14 The European Legacy, pp. 667–684; the young Jürgen 
Habermas, who had helped to provoke this debate, has clarified his assessment suggesting that it seems more 
appropriate to call Carl Schmitt Max Weber‘s ―natural son‖ (see the reference in K. Engelbrekt at p. 668). 
9 See O. Agevall, note 4, pp. 172-74. I H S — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — 5 
 
II.   The  European  Response  to  The  failures  of  Weber’s 
Nation  States  and  the  Problématique  of  its  Institutional 
Design 
The project of European integration can be understood and re-constructed as a response to 
the failures of the Weberian nation state, and, more generally and in broader perspectives, to 
Europe‘s bitter experiences in the Twentieth century. After 50 years of integration, however, 
we  are  confronted  with  massive  challenges:  ever  since  the  turn  to  majority-voting  in  the 
Single  European  Act  of  1987,  the  compatibility  of  European  rule  with  its  democratic 
commitments is discussed with ever increasing intensity. In the aftermath of the French and 
the Dutch referenda of 2005, concerns over its neo-liberal tilt and the social deficit, i.e., the 
compatibility of its institutional design and the welfare traditions of European democracies 
moved to centre stage. The Irish ―No‖ of 2008 to the Treaty of Lisbon was perceived as an 
erosion of the permissive consensus that had backed the progress of integration. During the 
present financial crisis the instability of Europe‘s economic constitution became apparent. All 
of these unresolved issues and queries seem to suggest that we can no longer be so sure 
about the sustainability of the European project, but have to re-consider our premises. 
It would, of course, be absurd to assume that conceptual re-orientations, which an academic 
legal exercise such as the one we are undertaking, could produce ready-made answers to 
the type of problems just named, or lead to immediate practical changes. The ambitions 
which we pursue when suggesting a new way of thinking are much more modest. But, in 
their conceptualisation of the integration project, they propagate a change of paradigmatic 
proportions.  European  law  tends  to  be  portrayed  as  an  ever  growing  and  ever  more 
comprehensive body of rules and principles of steadily richer normative qualities. This edifice 
is expected to come together through successive steps of legal integration. Such visions of 
the  integration  project  and  process  rest,  in  part  explicitly,  in  part  implicitly,  on  daring 
assumptions about the social functions of law and its powers. Giandomenico Majone has 
recently  characterised  this  conundrum  as  Europe‘s  ―operational  code‖:  the  ―priority  of 
integration over all other  competing  values‖.
10 One need, by no means, subscribe to  his 
diagnosis in all of its aspects when realising that, law can, indeed, use this operational code 
on its ―integration through law― path only if, and as long as, it insulates itself from many 
specifics  of  national  orders,  from  inherited  varieties  of  conflict  patterns  and  institutional 
mechanisms within economy and society  – and even from the aspirations of its Member 
States and their governments. 
The messages which we are going to submit under the title of the ―conflicts law alternative‖ 
differ  from  the  prevailing  visions  most  markedly  in  two  respects.  As  the  recourse  to  the 
notion of conflicts law indicates, the approach assigns primacy to the resolution of conflicts 
                                                       
10 Thus, G. Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power. The EU at Fifty, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010), p. 1. 6 — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — I H S 
 
 
arising  out  of  Europe‘s  diversity  rather  than  the  establishment  of  a  unitary  legal  regime. 
Equally important, the approach takes account of the ongoing contestation about the kind of 
polity  which  the  integration  process  is  to  generate.  This  contestation  is  not  different  in 
principle  from  the  ongoing  domestic  contests  about  the  proper  political  order  –  with  the 
important  difference,  however,  that  the  law  of  constitutional  democracies  provides  a 
framework which channels political contestation, while, in contrast, the law of the integration 
process cannot build upon this type of legitimating framework. The modesty of the pragmatic 
ambitions  which  have  underlined  must  not  be  understood  as  some  complacent  gesture. 
Quite to the contrary, we believe that the type of thinking and counter-visions which we seek 
to promote rests on quite solid grounds in the deeper structures of the European fabric. Its 
most widely-known reference point is the ―unity in diversity‖ motto of the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty.
11 Further precursors and allies can be named, such as Joseph Weiler‘s juxtaposition 
of  ―Europe  as  unity‖  v.  ―Europe  as  community‖,
12  and  Kalypso  Nicolaïdes‘  vision  of  a 
European ―demoi-cracy‖.
13 All that is original about the conflicts law approach is the plea for 
a  resort  to  legal  categories  derived  from  conflict  of  laws  traditions  and  conflict-of-laws 
methodologies in the legal re-construction of the ―unity in diversity‖ challenge. 
What  kind  of  validity  can  our  plea  for  re-orientation  claim?  The  binary  right/wrong, 
legal/illegal, lawful/unlawful codes in which the legal system operates, and to which lawyers 
appeal in their doctrinal argumentation, cannot be relied upon in our considerations without 
further ado. All of the important theories of legal integration have operated on horizons which 
that  code  cannot  reach  directly.  They  reflected  the  historical  context  of  the  integrations 
project, they sought to cope with the specifics and deficiencies of its institutional design – 
and,  indeed,  they  continue  with  similarly  comprehensive  reflections  when  addressing 
Europe‘s  present  challenges.  The  conflicts  law  approach  situates  itself  on  an  equivalent 
conceptual level. Just like its interlocutors in legal integration theory, it seeks to re-construct 
both the accomplishments of the integration project and its present impasses and crises, and 
to evaluate the pros and cons of the competing visions against such a background. It is of 
crucial importance to underline two limitations of this kind of exercise. It would, for one, be a 
misunderstanding to expect from the re-constructions of historical contexts and assumptions 
that they would reveal ―the true story‖ – a Leopold Rankan tale of ―wie es wirklich gewesen 
ist‖.  What  we  seek  to  understand  is  the  meta-positive  assumptions  on  which  legal 
conceptualisations  of  the  integration  project  have  relied,  and  from  which  they  sought  to 
derive normative guidance on their contributions to its operation. We will, then, necessarily, 
and deliberately so, have to proceed selectively, albeit not arbitrarily. Our re-construction will 
depart from, and be restricted to, three schools of thought of long-term significance. Each of 
the  three  approaches  has  some  fundamentum  in  re.  Each  of  them  can  claim  to 
conceptualise important elements of Europe‘s integration law, and each of them can provide 
                                                       
11 See note 1 supra. 
12 See Sections II.3 and III.2.3 infra. 
13 K. Nicolaïdis, ―The new constitution as European ‗demoi-cracy‘?‖ (2004) 7 Critical Review of International Social 
and Political Philosophy, pp. 76-93. I H S — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — 7 
 
normative  reasons  for  its  specific  conceptualisation:  the  model  of  European  rule 
(Sozialmodell)  which  it  defends  and  promotes.  It  is  a  further  characteristic  of  our  re-
construction that we take account of both the internal developments of each of these models 
and the continuous contestation among them, along with the ups and downs in terms of their 
practical  impact.  We  will  also  argue,  however,  that  all  three  have,  notwithstanding  their 
remarkable  viability,  deficits  in  common,  which  exhaust  their  potential  to  cope  with  the 
present challenges that Europe faces. 
One aspect which the three models have in common can be stated negatively. They were 
perfectly  aware  of  the  discrepancy  between  the  European  and  the  national  level  of 
governance, and did not conceive of the European Economic Community as a constitutional 
democracy  in  being.  What  they  have  in  common  is  a  search  for  legitimate  governance 
beyond nation-state confines and frames. Their messages on the modes of transnational 
governance,  however,  differ  significantly:  (1)  ―Europe  should  be  institutionalised  as  a 
technocratic  regime  and  be  restricted  to  that  function‖.  (2)  ―Europe‘s  vocation  is  the 
establishment of an ‗economic constitution‘ which is to protect individual freedoms and to 
discipline the  exercise of political power‖; and (3) ―Europe has accomplished and should 
preserve  an  equilibrium  between  a  supranational  legal  order  and  ongoing  political 
bargaining‖. We will in this section focus on the foundational period and underline here a 
common deficit; the further development if the thre approaches and their potential to cope 
with the ―transformations of Europe‖ will be addressed in a separate section (III). 
II.1.   Europe  as  Technocratic  Administration:  Hans  Peter  Ipsen  and 
Ernst Forsthoff 
Hans Peter Ipsen was the influential founding father of European Law in Germany. He was a 
very remarkable protagonist of Germany‘s legal scholarship. The Nazi period had left him, to 
paraphrase Hans Ulrich Jessurun d‘ Oliveira,
14 ―not totally flawless‖ (nicht ganz fleckenlos). 
His post-war work on the Basic Law of the young German democracy, however, documents 
very clearly democratic commitments in general, and to the Sozialstaatlichkeit of the new 
order in particular.
15 He had started to work on European law at the age of 50  – and helped 
to establish Europarecht as a new legal discipline.
16 Precisely his democratic commitments 
                                                       
14 H.U. Jessurun d‘Oliveira, ―An Anecdote, a Footnote‖, in: H.-P. Mansel  et al. (eds), Festschrift fürErik Jayme, 
(Munich: Sellier. European Law Publishers, 2004), 387-402. Oliveira, writing in 1968, referred to Hans Dölle, from 
1954 onwards one of the Directors of the Max-Planck Institute für auländisches und internationals Privatrecht in 
Hamburg; on Ipsen, see Ch. Joerges, ―Europe a Großraum? Shifting Legal Conceptualisations of the Integration 
Project‖,  in:  Ch.  Joerges  &  N.S.  Ghaleigh  (eds),  Darker  Legacies  of  Law  in  Europe:  The  Shadow  of  National 
Socialism and Fascism over Europe and its Legal Traditions (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003), pp. 167-191, at 182-84 
(note 92). 
15 Suffice it here to point to H.P. Ipsen, ―Über das Grundgesetz‖ (1949), reprinted along with all of his later essays in 
idem, Über das Grundgesetz (Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1988), pp 1-37. 
16 See H.  P. Ipsen, ―Der deutsche Jurist und das Europäische Gemeinschaftsrecht―, in:  Verhandlungen des 43. 
Deutschen Juristentages, (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1964, vol. 2 L 14 et seq; idem, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 
(Tübingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1972), p. 176 et seq; very remarkable, in the present context, is his rejection of the idea 
of an economic constitution at both European and national level in his Gemeinschaftsrecht, pp. 563-566. 8 — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — I H S 
 
 
may explain both: Ipsen‘s sensitivity for the precarious legitimacy of the European system on 
the one hand, and the affinities between his own response and the work of one of Germany‘s 
most famous contemporary constitutionalists, namely, Ernst Forsthoff, on the other. These 
affinities  are,  at  first  sight,  somewhat  surprising  in  view  of  the  differences  in  their 
constitutional theorizing;
17 they are, nevertheless, plausible in view of Ipsen‘s search for a 
type of rule whose validity was not dependent on democratic legitimacy. The communities 
were  to  confine  themselves  to  administering  questions  of  ―knowledge‖,  but  leave  truly 
―political‖  questions  to  democratic  bodies.
18  The  characterisation  of  the  European 
Communities as ―Zweckverbände funktionaler Integration‖ (organisations with functionally-
defined objectives)‖ was path-breaking. With this theory, Ipsen rejected both further-reaching 
federal  integration  notions  and  earlier  interpretations  of  the  Community  as  a  mere 
international organisation. He saw Community law as a tertium between (federal) state law 
and international law, constituted by its ―objective tasks‖ and adequately legitimised by their 
solution.
19 This theory had an implicit answer to the queries about ―the social‖ on offer. Ernst 
Forsthoff had, in his contribution to the so-called Sozialstaatskontroverse, argued that the 
realisation of social objectives had to operate outside the rule of law; the provision of welfare 
was hence, by virtue of the very nature of social policies, characterised as an administrative 
task, which was incompatible with the commitment to the Rechtsstaat (―rule of law‖) in the 
Basic  Law.
20  This  was  not  a  principled  objection  against  welfare  policies.  What  is, 
nevertheless, difficult to conceive is how the European  Zweckverband with its transnational 
machinery  might  actively  pursue  the  type  of  activities  which  welfare  states  administer 
domestically. In more principled terms, it seemed, at any rate, inconceivable that the type of 
a  ―hard‖  legal  Sozialstaats-commitment,  which  Forsthoff‘s  opponents  understood  as  a 
constitutive dimension of the Federal Republic‘s democracy,
21 would be institutionalised at 
European level. 
                                                       
17 See H.P. Ipsen, Über das Grundgesetz, (note 15), reprinted also in E Forsthoff (ed), Rechtsstaatlichkeit und 
Sozialstaatlichkeit,  (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft,  1968),  pp.  16-41,  on the  one hand,  and E. 
Forsthoff,  ―Begriff  und  Wesen  des  sozialen  Rechtsstaats‖,  in  (1954)  12  Veröffentlichungen  der  Vereininigung 
deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, pp. 8-36. 
18 Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, (note16 supra), p. 1045. 
19 See H.P. Ipsen, Verfassungsperspektiven der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970). , 
p. 8 et seq., and the interpretation by M. Kaufmann, Europäische Integration und Demokratieprinzip, (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos, 1997), p. 300 et seq., & 312 et seq; see, also, M. Bach, Die Bürokratisierung Europas. Verwaltungseliten, 
Experten und politische Legitimation in Europa, (Frankfurt aM: Campus, 1999), p. 38 et seq. 
20 E. Forsthoff, ―Begriff und Wesen des sozialen Rechtstaates‖ (note17 supra). 
21 The so-called Sozialstaats-debate is an evergreen in German constitutionalism; for recent contributions, see O. 
Eberl, ―Soziale Demokratie in Europa und zwischen Konstitutionalismus und Etatismus‖, in: A. Fischer-Lescano, F. 
Rödl & Ch. Schmid (eds), Europäische Gesellschaftsverfassung. Zur Konstitutionalisierung sozialer Demokratie in 
Europa, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009), pp. 245-256. A. Fischer-Lescano, ―Europäische Rechtspolitik und soziale 
Demokratie‖, in Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Internationale Politikanalyse, Abt. Internationaler Dialog) 2010, Bonn 2010; 
Ch. Joerges, ―Rechtsstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European Integration 
Process‖, (2010) 9 Comparative Sociology, pp. 65-85. I H S — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — 9 
 
II.2.   Europe's Economic Ordo: Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm 
The  notion  of  the  ―social  market  economy‖  was  formally  introduced  into  Europe‘s 
constitutional parlance by a joint motion of Joschka Fischer and Domenique de Villepin in the 
course of the debates on the Constitutional Treaty.
22 Their initiative was meant to calm down 
the anxieties over what was perceived as a neo -liberal tilt in the constitutional project. The 
clause on the social market economy has fulfilled this function quite well in the general 
public, and in the constitutional discourses of both lawyers
23 and political scientists.
24 The 
vague  notion  of  the  ―social‖  and  simultaneously  ―competitive‖  market  economy  of  the 
Convention and the Treaty of Lisbon is situated at a great distance from the original and 
fairly  precise  contours  of  Germany‘s  ―sozialer  Marktwirtschaft‖.
25  As  the  most  important 
protagonist of the concept, Alfred Müller-Armack, explained repeatedly, the social market 
economy was to provide a ―third way‖ beyond economic liberalism, on the one hand, and 
beyond socialism, on the other. There was no conditioning of this model by requirements of 
―competitiveness‖;  quite  to  the  contrary,  the  governance  of  market  mechanisms  were 
subjected to commands of social justice.
 26 
Müller-Armack and his political allies were keen to underline the compatibility of their vision 
with  the  Ordo-liberal  School  of  economics  and  the  essential  role  assigned  to  economic 
freedoms  and  the  protection  of  an  undistorted  system  of  competition  by  law  and  strong 
politically-independent enforcement authorities. The development of Ordo-liberalism as an 
economic theory and vision of a political order had started in the early 1920s as a counter-
move against the strong cartelisation of the German economy and its corporatist links with a 
weak political system. The school survived National Socialism; it was perceived as a tradition 
not contaminated by National Socialism and therefore entitled to broad public recognition 
and influence. The details need not concern us here. What is important to note, however, is 
                                                       
22 See the references in Ch. Joerges, ―What is left of the European Economic Constitution? A Melancholic Eulogy‖, 
(2005) 30 European Law Review, pp. 461-489, at 486. 
23 See, for example, F.C. Mayer, ―Die Rückkehr der Europäischen Verfassung?  Ein Leitfaden zum Vertrag von 
Lissabon‖, (2008) Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, pp. 1141-1217, at 1165 et seq; idem, ―Der EuGH 
und das soziale Europa―, in Internationale Politikanalyse, (Berlin: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2009), pp. 7-25 and the 
contributions to: U. Neergaard, R. Nielsen & L. Roseberry (eds), Integrating Welfare Functions into EU Law - From 
Rome to Lisbon, (Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2009), and most prominently the German Constitutional Court‘s 
judgment of 30 June 2008 on the Treaty of Lisbon. Bundesverfassungsgericht, file no.: 2 BvE 2 / 08, 2 BvE 5 / 08, 2 
BvR 1010 / 08, 2 BvR 1022 / 08, 2 BvR 1259 / 08 und 2 BvR 182 / 09, paras. 195 et seq.; the provisional English 
translation is available at:   
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208.en.html. 
24 See, for example, U. Liebert, ―Reconciling Social with Market Europe? The EU under the Lisbon Treaty‖, in, 
―European Economic and Social Constitutionalism after the Treaty of Lisbon‖, D. Schiek, U. Liebert & H. Schneider 
(eds),  European  Economic  and  Social  Constitutionalism  after  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, forthcoming), Chapter 2. 
25  See,  on  the  following,  Ph.  Manow,  ―Modell  Deutschland  as  an  Interdenominational  Compromise―,  Minda  De 
Gunzburg Centre for European Studies, Working Paper 003/2001; A. Ebner, ―The intellectual foundations of the 
social market economy. Theory, policy, and implications for European integration‖, (2006) 33 Journal of Economic 
Studies, pp. 206-223. 
26 See, the references in Ch. Joerges & F. Rödl, ―‗Social Market Economy‘ as Europe‘s Social Model?‖, in: Lars 
Magnusson & Bo Stråth (eds), A European Social Citizenship? Preconditions for Future Policies in Historical Light. 
Preconditions for Future Policies from a Historical Perspective, (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2005), pp. 125-158. 10 — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — I H S 
 
 
our concern for the social dimension of the European project, the initial compatibility of Ordo-
liberalism and the model of the social market, and the dissolution of this alliance which was 
replaced by a new alliance between the second generation of Ordo-liberalism and Anglo-
Saxon neo-liberalism. 
The leading protagonists of the Freiburg School, the intellectual Heimat of Germany‘s post-
war Ordo-liberalism in both economic and  legal scholarship,  namely, Walter Eucken and 
Franz Böhm, derived from the dual commitments to the idea of an ―undistorted system of 
competition‖, on the one hand, and to the promise of social justice and security, on the other, 
a  challenging  task:    the  dual  commitment  required  institutionalising  specific,  albeit  inter-
dependent,  orders,  namely,  a  legally-structured  order  of  industrial  relations  and  of  social 
security (Arbeits- und Sozialverfassung) along with the legally guaranteed economic ordo, 
the ―economic constitution‖ (Wirtschaftsverfassung). In this sense, the economic order of the 
which the protagonists of the ―social market economy‖ envisaged was meant to be ―socially 
embedded‖. 
The ―really existing social market economy‖, however, was never as coherently realised as 
their conceptual Vordenker would have liked to see it. Even its economic core institution – its 
Wirtschaftsverfassung  –  was,  by  no  means,  a  theoretically-uncontested  and  legally-
consolidated  project.  The  strongest  practical  challenge  to  the  Freiburg  style  of 
Ordnungspolitik was the renaissance of Germany‘s corporatist traditions already in the early 
years of the Bonn Republic. The Federal Republic was characterised by permanent tensions 
between  Theorie  und  Praxis:  striking  discrepancies  between  the  officious  rhetoric  of 
Ordnungspolitik, on the one hand, and the ongoing bargaining between the political system 
and the political and economic actors, on the other  – a German Lebenslüge, to be sure, 
albeit an economically-successful and socially-beneficial arrangement.
27 The perception of 
this discrepancy will have influenced the (ordo) -liberal  ―turn  to  Europe‖,  which  implied  a 
retraction  from  their  earlier  more  global  political  preference.
28  The  European  level  of 
governance promised to ensure stronger barriers against the  renaissance  of  Germany‘s 
corporatist traditions and its political opportunism in economic affairs than the institutional 
pillars of Germany‘s Ordnungspolitik. 
                                                       
27 Well documented by W. Abelshauser, Die Langen Fünfziger Jahre. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Deutschland 
1949–1966, (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1987). 
28The scepticism and resistance of leading ordo -liberals has been re -constructed and explained in detail by M 
Wegmann, Früher Neoliberalismus und europäische Integration: Interdependenz der nationalen, supranationalen 
und  internationalen  Ordnung  von  Wirtschaft  und  Gesellschaft  (1932 –1965),  (Baden-Baden:  Nomos,  2002), 
especially p. 351  et seq., for the importance of the political and social constitution for the project of economic 
integration (pp. 359–366). I H S — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — 11 
 
II.3.   Europe as Community: Joseph H.H. Weiler 
In his very first publication on European issues,
29 Joseph Weiler presented a vision, which 
he substantiated and defended in his Ph.D thesis,
30 then retold, refined and complemented 
in his seminal narrative on the ―Transformation of Europe‖:
31 Europe has, in its foundational 
period,  so  Weiler  argued,  managed  to  establish  an  equilibrium  between  legal 
supranationalism and political intergovernmentalism. His portrayal of European integration 
was inspired by his teachers in international law, on the one hand, and by the work of Erik 
Stein,  on  the  other,  but  it  was  path-breaking  and  unique  in  its  doctrinal  lucidity  and  its 
sensitivity for the European synthesis of ―the political‖ and the law. 
Weiler‘s oeuvre is a powerful critique of the type of national state which Weber‘s inaugural 
address describes.
32 Nowhere, however, did he talk about something akin to ―social Europe‖. 
Even  in  the  concluding  passages  on  democracy  in  Europe  and  the  legitimacy  of  the 
integration project of the ―Transformations of Europe‖, there is no mention of the possibility 
that  democracy  might  pre-suppose  social  justice  and  that  Europe‘s  socially-defined 
legitimacy might erode through a destruction of welfare state traditions. And yet, even though 
Weiler‘s value-laden work is characterised by a profound distance to technocratic precepts 
and  economic  rationalisation  of  the  European  Community,  his  visions  seem  surprisingly 
compatible with the benign neglect of the ―social deficit‖ of the European order in European 
legal  studies  during  the  foundational  period.  To  be  sure,  Weiler‘s  re-construction  of  the 
Europe as a Janus-headed polity was not meant as a conceptualisation which would exclude 
Europe‘s engagement in social issues as a matter of (legal) principle. It is, nevertheless, true 
that, thanks to the Realpolitik-kernel of his analysis, ―social Europe‖ was an unlikely option, 
and one of very limited significance, anyway. It was highly unlikely simply because its advent 
was dependent on unanimous inter-governmental voting; it was, by the same token, of little 
concern  as  the  later  tensions  between  the  integrationist  objective  and  the  legacy  of 
European welfarism were still dormant. 
II.4.   Three Concluding Observations 
As  an  interim  summary,  we  can  put  on  record  an  ambivalent  legacy  of  the  foundational 
period. On its bright side, we note the turning away from the Weberian nation state; less 
fortunate, however, was the benign neglect of the welfarist commitments of West European 
democracies. Both aspects deserve some further comments. 
                                                       
29 J.H.H. Weiler, ―The Community system: the dual character of supranationalism‖, (1981) 1 Yearbook of European 
Law, pp. 257–306. 
30 Idem, Il sistema comunitario europeo: struttura giuridica e processo politico, (Bologna : Il Mulino, 1985). 
31 Idem, ―The Transformation of Europe‖, (1990–91) 100 Yale Law Journal, pp. 2403–2485. 
32 See the thorough analysis by D. Gaus, ―Legitimate Political Rule Without a State? An analysis of Joseph H.H. 
Weiler‘s justification of the legitimacy of the European Union qua non-statehood‖, RECON Online Working paper 
2008/12, avalaible at: www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html. 12 — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — I H S 
 
 
II.4.1  The Taming of Weber’s National State 
The designers of the EEC-Treaty were both realistic and wise enough to understand that the 
darker legacy of the European political and economic nationalism would not fade away with 
the  end of the  war. Their  objectives,  however,  were institutionalised prudently. The three 
foundational theories which we have sketched out have understood these messages and 
integrated them into their conceptualisation of the European project: no discrimination on 
grounds of nationality, no resorting to the political power of the state as an instrument of 
parochial  economic  advantages,  common  economic freedoms  in  the  pursuit  of  economic 
prosperity – this was the lesson Europe seemed to have learned. 
II.4.2  The  Neglect  of  the  Welfare  State  Legacy  of  European 
Democracies 
We have defined the second communality of the early legal-integration theories negatively. It 
is more troubling, because the institutionalisation of welfare commitments could be, and was 
in fact, widely understood as a ―second pillar‖ of Europe‘s democratic conversion, a societal 
shield  providing  protection  against  a  rebirth  of  the  social  anxieties  which  nationalist 
movements had instrumentalized. Why is it, we are both inclined and entitled to ask, that 
precisely the welfare state traditions of European democracies are not visible in the legal 
theories of European integration? Why does it need historians like Alan Milward
33 and Tony 
Judt
34  to  remind  Europe‘s  legal  academia  that  welfare  traditions  are  what  Europeans  do 
have in common and  what distinguishes their collective memories from that of American 
citizens?  Why  does  it  need  political-scientists  like  Fritz  Scharpf
35  and  Giandomenico 
Majone
36 to remind European constitutionalists, albeit in very  different perspectives, of the 
structural asymmetries in their constitutional visions? How comes that a scholar of the format 
and sensitivity of Joseph Weiler, in his seminal narrative on the ―Transformation of Europe‖,
37 
fails to address the issue of ―social Europe‖, and, even in his comment on the Treaty of 
Maastricht, continues to present ―prosperity‖ as Europe‘s second value once without ever 
relating  to  social  justice.  What  he  offers,  instead,  is  quite  in  line  with  his  appeal  to 
―Community‖,  a  somewhat  metaphorical  uploading  of  the  notion  of  ―prosperity‖  with  a 
―solidarity‖ dimension: a soft power, which he expects to control ―the demonic at the statal 
                                                       
33 A. Milward, The Rescue of the European Nation-State, (London: Routledge 2nd. ed., 2000), pp. 21 et seq. 
34 T. Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 791 et seq.; idem, Ill 
Fares the Land, (New York: The Penguin Press, 2010), pp 127- 237 and passim. 
35 See, for example, Fritz W. Scharpf, ―The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity‖, (2002) 
40  Journal  of  Common  Market  Studies,  pp.  645-670,  at  645-646,  and,  recently,  ―The Asymmetry  of  European 
Integration  – Or Why the EU Cannot Be a Social Market Economy‖, MPIfG Working Paper 09/12, available at 
www.mpifg.de. 
36 Europe as he Would-be World Power (note 10 supra), p. 128 et seq. Majone is well aware, however, of the 
foundational moment; see his classic Regulating Europe, (Routledge: London-New York, 1996), p. 1: ―At the end of 
the period of reconstruction of the national economies shattered by the war income redistribution and discretionary 
macroeconomic management emerged as the top policy priorities of most Western European governments…‖. 
37 Note 31supra, see, in particular, pp. 2476 et seq. I H S — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — 13 
 
economic level‖.
38 Is it by chance that, in European constitutionalism, it took primarily labour 
lawyers to remind us of the importance of ―the social‖ for democratic constitutionalism?
39 
The omission of a ―social dimension‖ in the conceptualisation of the European project seems 
not so much a surprising omission, as a downright a failure. During the foundational period, 
welfare state policies and practices were, of course, controversial in many respects, but they 
were understood as national affairs. Only with hindsight have the implications and effects of 
this constellation become so clearly visible. Stefano Giubboni who has re-constructed both 
the mindset of the ―founding fathers‖ and the political bargaining over the Treaty of Rome 
carefully, concludes that we have to understand this outcome not as a mere failure but as a 
―historical compromise‖.
40 The parties to this compromise are said to have trusted in the the 
wisdom  of  eminent  economists  who  expected  very  positive  effects  from  an  opening  of 
national Volkswirtschaften;
41 they may also have trusted in he sustainability of a constellation 
which  eminent  politi cal  scientists  were  to  characterise  as  an  politically  and  socially 
―embedded  liberalism‖.
42  Such  positive  expectations  seem  well  compatible  with  stringent 
transnational regulation where such interventionism were held to be indispensable, i.e., in 
agricultural policy. Legal scholarship, however, treated this socially extremely important and 
economically extremely costly domain as an ―exception‖ in the European edifice, which did 
not deserve, and did not, in fact, attract, closer academic scrutiny for a very long time to 
come.
43 
II.4.3  Historical  Indeterminacy  and  the  Indispensability  of  Theory  in 
Legal Argumentation 
The  differences  in  the  re-construction  of  the  foundational  constellation  between  the 
institutional  generalists  in  European  legal  scholarship,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  later 
generation  of  labour  law  constitutionalists  are  quite  illuminating:  Brian  Bercusson,  writing 
under  the  impression  of  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht,  put  all  his  hopes  on  the  ―outstanding 
importance‖ of what was accomplished therein.
44 Stefano Giubboni,
 45 writing a decade later, 
                                                       
38 See idem, ―Fin-de-Si￨cle Europe‖ in: R. Dehousse (ed), Europe After Maastricht: An Ever Closer Union, (Munich: 
C.H. Beck, 1994), pp. 203-216, at 208 et seq. 
39 See B. Bercusson, ―Social policy at the Crossrods: European labour law after Maastricht‖, in: R. Dehousse (ed), 
note 38 supra, pp 149-186; S. Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedoms in the EuropeanConstitution. A Labour 
Law  Perspective,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2006);  B.  Bercusson,  S.  Deakin,  P.  Koistinen,  Y. 
Kravaritou, U. Mückenberger & A. Supiot, ―A Manifesto for Social Europe‖, (1997) 3 European Law Journal, pp. 189-
205. 
40 Ibid., p. 7. 
41 See, most notably, the ―Ohlin Report‖: International Labour Organisation, ―Social Aspects of European Economic 
Co-operation. Report by a Group of Experts‖, in (1956) 74 International Labour Review, pp. 99-123. 
42 J.G. Ruggie, ―International Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic 
Order‖, (1982) 36  International Organization, pp. 375-415; see J. Steffek, Embedded Liberalism and Its Critics: 
Justifying Global Governance in the American Century, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
43 Until F. Snyder, Law of the Common Agricultural Policy, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1985); for a comprehensive 
recent analysis, see K. Zurek, ―European Food Regulation after Enlargement: Should Europe‘s Modes of Regulation 
Provide for more Flexibility‖, Ph.D Thesis EUI Florence 2010 (Chapter III). 
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complemented  the  projection  of  positive  signals  into  the  European  development  in  his 
comments  on  the  later  Treaty  amendments  and  the  (Draft)  Constitutional  Treaty;
46  in 
addition, he started to seek legally-relevant backing for his views in the ―compromise‖ which 
he read into the Treaty of Rome: 
[T]he apparent flimsiness of the social provisions of the Treaty of Rome (and of the slightly 
less meagre ones of the Treaty of Paris, was in reality consistent with the intention, imbued 
with the embedded liberalism compromise, not only preserve but hopefully to expand and 
strengthen the member States‘ powers of economic intervention and social governance: i.e., 
their ability to keep the promise of protection underlying the new social contract signed by 
their own citizens at the end of the war.
47 
Lasciate ogni speranza is, instead, the main message of Florian Rödl,
48 writing after Viking 
and Laval, as far as the actual development of the Union is concerned. He renews, however, 
the defence of ―Social Europe‖ by the re-construction of the foundational constellation as a 
legally significant ―compromise‖. It seems, indeed, plausible to argue that the premises of the 
negotiators and their understanding of the EEC Treaty should be taken into account in the 
interpretation of Treaty provisions such as Article 153 (5) TFEU (ex-Article 137 (5)), which 
stipulates that ―the provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, 
the right to strike and the right to impose lock-out‖.
49 The legal surplus of such suggestions 
seems  minimal,  however,  and  is  a  shaky  ground  for  far-reaching  conclusions  as  to  the 
Union‘s social commitments. The Treaty of Rome has mentioned, in its Title III of Part Three, 
significant  social  fields,  and  Member  States  were,  as  Article  118  EEC  Treaty  confirms, 
expected to co-operate closely. It is also true that distributional and income polices were 
foreseen in an important part of the European Economy, namely, agriculture. Agustìn José 
Menéndez
50 reads these provisions as strong elements of a federal structure foreshadowing 
the  strengthening  of  the  federalisation  of  Europe,  whereas,  in  Giandomenico  Majone‘s 
view,
51  they  confirm  that  the  social -policy  domain  was  ―considered  to  be  outside  the 
competence of the supranational institutions‖.
52 Both of these readings are based on the 
same historical evidence. Both of them can claim to be valid – but they need to base their 
claims upon re-constructions which are informed by non-historical theoretical premises. 
                                                                                                                                                      
45 Diritti Sociali e Mercato. La Dimensione Sociale dell’Integrazione Europea, (Bologna: Il Molino, 2003); (English 
version in note 39). 
46 S. Giubboni, Social Rights (note 39 supra) at pp. 94-150. 
47 Ibid., p. 16. 
48 F. Rödl, ―Labour Constitution‖, in: A. v. Bogdandy & J. Bast (eds), Principles of European Constitutional Law, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010), pp. 605-640; for a very similar argument, see L. Niglia, ―Form and Substance in 
European Constitutional law: The ‗Social‘ Character of Indirect Effect‖, (2010) 16 European Law Journal, pp. 439-
457. 
49 On the doctrinal controversies on this provision, see Section V.3.2. infra. 
50 ―United they diverge? From conflicts to constitutional theory? Critical remarks on Joerges‘ theory of conflicts of 
law‖, contribution to the workshop ―The changing role of law in the age of supra- and transnational governance‖ 
(note * supra; on file with author). 
51 Majone, Europe as he Would-be World Power, (note 10 supra), p. 131 et seq. 
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What we can more safely assume is simply that the negotiators operated on the assumption 
of  same  kind  of  ―embedded  liberalism‖  and  its  sustainability,  so  that  the  protagonists  of 
welfare policies could live with the compromise. If such expectations proved to be wrong, 
legal reasoning must not assume that conclusive normative arguments can be derived from 
―historical facts‖; it must, instead, engage in conceptual deliberations and controversies. It 
must  become  aware  of  the  non-historical  normative  and  analytical  issues  underlying 
historical re-constructions like those we have just mentioned. These issues are complex and 
sensitive: Does democratic governance, as a matter of principle, require that the objectives 
of social justice can be pursued by the political system? If so, is it at all conceivable that 
welfare policies can be successful institutionalised at European level, or is it, in view of the 
diversity of socio-economic conditions, political traditions and preference, more promising to 
preserve their variety? 16 — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — I H S 
 
 
III.   Hindsight and Foresight 
We have started this essay by listing some enormous challenges which Europe is facing 
today. The ―social deficit‖, which we have traced back to the institutional design of the Treaty 
of Rome, is just one of them, albeit one of particular importance in view of the collateral 
damage in terms of the social acceptance of the Union and the growing risks of populism 
and xenophobia. The social deficit furthermore illustrates particularly drastically the impasses 
of European politics, which result from the reliance of the integration project on the so-called 
Community Method. We will – in the first step of this section – illustrate these difficulties 
briefly, before we again take up the discussion of the three legal conceptualisations of the 
integration project. The development of these conceptualisations mirror, so we will argue, the 
practical impasses of European politics. It is important not to misunderstand the exercise we 
are  undertaking  as  some  fundamental  critique,  not  even  as  a  further  characterisation  of 
Europe as a ―faltering project‖.
53 Instead, its objective is to pave the way for a paradigm shift 
which  would  defend  the  Union‘s  accomplishments  and,  at  the  same  time,  open  new 
perspectives. 
III.1.   Fragile Pillars of “Social Europe” 
The story of Social Europe has much in common with Michael Ende‘s most famous fairy 
tale.
54 Every move in the process of economic integration was accompanied by counter -
moves towards a social re-imbedding of the European polity. These counter -moves did not 
just  occur  through  the  conferral  of  new  competences  to  the  Community  in  treaty 
amendments and subsequent legislative arenas. The ECJ, in particular through its anti -
discrimination  jurisprudence,  operated  as  a  progressive  instigator,  and  the  referen ce 
procedure was often enough prudently and successfully used by labour law networks.
55 
However,  most  of  the  changes  were  piece -meal  with  no  comprehensive  long -term 
background agenda. 
Social  aspirations  were  more  explicitly  articulated  in  the  aftermath  of  t he  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam. The contours of what was to constitute Europe‘s ―social dimension‖, however, 
remained vague. Key concepts from national welfare states appeared in official documents 
without  an  equivalent  institutional  background.  This  held  true  for  Germany‘s  ―soziale 
Marktwirtschaft‖,
56 for France‘s ―services publiques‖,
57 and T.H. Marshall‘s notion of ―social 
                                                       
53 See J. Habermas, ―European Politics at an Impasse. A Plea for a Policy of Graduated Integration‖ in:  idem, 
Europe: The Faltering Project, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009), pp. 78-106. 
54 Michael Ende, The Neverending Story,( New York: Penguin Books, 1983). 
55 See S. Sciarra, (ed), Labour Law in the Courts. National Judges and the European Court of Justice, (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2001). 
56 See references above in notes 25, 26, & 35. 
57  See  the  comparative  account  in  M.  Krajewski,  Grundstrukturen  des  Rechts  öffentlicher  Dienstleistungen, 
Heidelberg:  Springer,  2010),  p.  55  et  seq.;  for  the  European  level,  see  U.  Neergard,  ―Services  of  General 
(Economic) Interest: What Goals and Values Count?‖, in: U. Neergard et al. (note 23), pp. 191-225. I H S — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — 17 
 
rights‖.
58  The  only  transnational  European  innovation  was  the  ―Open  Method  of  Co-
ordination‖ which the Lisbon Council of 2000 brought to bear in new areas of social policy.
59 
Even Fritz W. Scharpf initially suggested that this alternative to the traditional community 
method ―could hold considerable promise‖.
60 Sophisticated theorists were persuaded by the 
prospect of a seemingly democratic ―learning through monitoring‖.
61 This initial enthusiasm 
was to fade away with the rather modest accomplishments of the Treaty of Lisbon, on the 
one hand, ambivalent or inconclusive practical experiences,
62 and, last, but not least, the 
recent dis-embedding moves in the labour law jurisprudence of the ECJ, on the other.
63 
III.2.   The Foresight of Theory: Three Retractions 
The  rejection  of  all  the  constitutional  ambitions  in  the  Treaty  of  Lisbon  and  the  present 
impasses of the integration praxis are also observable in the legal integration theory. Tellingly 
enough, this holds true for all of the three conceptualisations that we have sketched out 
above. This observation seems all the more significant as these three models – technocratic 
rule, economic rationality, and the community vision  – were not chosen at random. They 
represent  quite  comprehensively  the  evolutionary  options  among  which  the  integration 
project can choose and kept oscillating. All of them have been continuously present since the 
foundational  period.  They  have  been  developing,  even  mutating,  within  their  particular 
perspectives, be it in their responses to changing contexts, be it through mutual observation 
and political learning. We can neither try to document the continuities and innovations within 
each tradition, nor discuss the affinities between them in any detail. It is sufficient, for our 
argument, to characterise  crucial transformations within each of them  – and to underline 
telling parallels in their diagnosis of the current impasses. 
III.2.1 Technocracy without Efficiency? Majone’s Critical Turn  
The importance of the technocratic tradition in the praxis of the integration project can hardly 
be over-estimated. Its weight was bound to increase with the involvement of the European 
Community in ever more regulatory policies  which  were to  be organised  at transnational 
                                                       
58 T.H. Marshall, ―Citizenship and Social Class‖, in idem, Class, Citizenship and Social Development, (Westport CT: 
Greenwood Press, 1973), pp. 65-122. 
59  See for an analysis of the legal meaning of coordination powers by Beate Braams, Beate Braams, Die 
Kompetenzordnung im Vertrag von Lissabon, in: Ingol f Pernice (ed),  Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Reform der EU 
ohne Verfassung?, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2008), pp. 115-134.  
60  See F.W. Scharpf,  ―European  Governance:  Common  Concerns  vs. The  Challenge  of  Diversity‖,  in:  Christian 
Joerges, Yves Mény & J.H.H. Weiler (eds), ―Mountain or Molehill? A Critical Appraisal of the Commission White 
Paper  on  Governance‖,  EUI  Florence/NYU  Law  School  2002,  pp.  1-12,  at  9,  available  at:
 
http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/Research/OnlineSymposia/Governance.shtml. 
61 Ch.F. Sabel & J. Zeitlin, ―Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the 
European Union‖, (2008) 14 European Law Journal, pp. 271-327. 
62 For a recent comprehensive evaluation oin legal theory perspectives, see M. Dawson,  New Governance and the 
Proceduralisation  of  European  Law:  The  Case  of  the  Open  Method  of  Coordination,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  forthcoming  2011),  for  an  analysis  in  social  theory  perspectives,  see  P.F.  Kjaer,  Between 
Governing  and  Governance:  On  the  Emergence,  Function  and  Form  of  Europe’s  Post-national  Constellation, 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
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levels without the backing of a consolidated democratic order. How else than through an 
―objective‖ and expertise-based conceptualisation of its enormous tasks could the European 
Community hope to ensure the acceptance of its involvement in ever more problem-solving 
activities? The by far most interesting and influential work which renewed and refined the 
technocratic legacy is that of Giandomenico Majone.
64 It is unique not only in its clar ity and 
its coherence, but also in its reflections of the option for an alternative to the democratic 
constitutionalism  the  Member  States  of  the  European  Union.  Majone‘s  famous 
conceptualisation  of Europe as a ―regulatory  State‖
  65 which operates  essentially  through 
non-majoritarian institutions was conceived as ensuring the credibility of commitments to in 
principle  uncontested  policy  objectives.  Welfare  policies  pose  additional  problems.  The 
Union‘s  failure  to  institutionalize  a  comprehensive  social  policy  results  partly  from  the 
―reluctance of the member states to surrender control of a politically salient and popular area 
of public policy‖; equally important is the factual difficulty and political impossibility to replace 
the variety of European welfare state models and traditions by some integrated European 
scheme.
66 Not only does Majone respect the primacy of constitutional democracies; he is 
equally, and with increasing urgency, underlining the fallacy of an ever more perfect and 
comprehensive subjection of the integration project to its ―operational code‖, the principle 
―that integration has priority over all competing values‖
 67, and also the camouflage strategies 
which he calls ―integration by stealth‖.
68 This is an alarming retraction from his earlier trust in 
the problem-solving potential of the European project. His warnings do, by no means, reflect 
a  change  of  theoretical  premises.  Majone  continues  to  underline  that  Europe  is  not 
legitimated  to  pursue  the  type  of  distributional  politics  which  welfare  states  have 
institutionalised.
69 He does not retract his plea for regulatory efficiency. His critical turn is, 
instead, motivated by the  inefficiencies which he observes in the Union‘s operations. His 
quest  for  more  modesty  in  Europe‘s  ambitions  (―Geht’s  nicht  eine  Nummer  kleiner?‖)
70 
summarises  these  observations.  His  adaption  of  the  ―unity  in  diversity‖  formula
71  is  an 
implication of these insights to which we will return in the following Section IV. 
                                                       
64 Who confronted Europe‘s integration studies right upon his return to Europe with essays like ―Regulating Europe: 
Problems  and  Prospects‖,  (1989)  3  Jahrbuch  zur  Staats-  und  Verwaltungswissenschaft,  pp.  159-177;  “Cross-
national resources of regulatory policymaking in Europe and the United States‖, (1991) 11 Journal of Public Policy, 
pp. 79-106 and kept working on the perspectives outlined therein ever since (see most recently his Europe as the 
Would-be word power, (note 10 supra). 
65 G. Majone, ―The European Community as a Regulatory State‖, 1994-V/1 Collected Courses of the Academy of 
European Law, (Den Haag-Boston MA-London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996), pp. 321-419. 
66 Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, (note 10 supra), at 144. 
67 Ibid., p. 1. 
68 See his Dilemmas of European Inregration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by Stealth, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
69 Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, (note 10 supra), p. 128 et seq. 
70 Ibid., p. 170 et seq. 
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III.2.2  What is left of the Economic Constitution? Ordoliberal Concerns 
An  institutionalisation  of  economic  rationality  is  most  widely  perceived  to  day,  either 
affirmatively  or  critically,  as  Europe‘s  main  agenda.
72 This  perception  gained  prominence 
since the legendary White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market.
73 At that stage of 
the integration process, the ordo -liberal tradition had experienced a deep transformation. 
That mutation had started at national level with the move of Friedrich von Hayek from 
Chicago to Freiburg and his promotion of version of  neo-liberalism situated between the 
Freiburg  School‘s  orthodoxy,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Chicago  School‘s  normative 
compalceny,  on  the  other.  Von  Hayek‘s  notion  of  ―competition  as  a  discovery  process‖ 
captures the essence of his messages best. They have led the second generation of ordo-
liberal  scholars  to  re-define  the  objectives  and  the  methods  of  national  and  European 
competition law. Attention shifted from the control of economic power to the protection of 
entrepreneurial freedom and the critique of anti-competitive regulation. What happened in 
the 1970s had been not anticipated, but was analysed with an amazing precision a good 
number of years ago by Michel Foucault in the course of the lectures he delivered at the 
Collège de France.
74 There, Foucault characterised the ordo-liberal vision of the strong state 
which is committed to the protection of the competitive ordering of the market as a new type 
of governmentalité, namely, the acceptance of market governance by the political system 
and the whole of society.
75 There are remarkable affinities between the second generation of 
Ordoliberals and the Chicago School when it comes to practical issues of competition law 
and policy, but they have never led to a real merger of the two schools.  The heirs of Eucken 
and von Hayek did not subscribe to the Chicago understanding of economic output efficiency 
and  ―consumer  welfare‖  but  continued  to  define  and  defend  the  ―system  of  undistorted 
competition‖ as the core of Europe‘s ―economic constitution‖.
 76 They witnessed, however, a 
steady decline of the impact of their visions, which became clearly visible in the substantial 
broadening  of  European  economic  policies  in  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht,
77  the  so-called 
                                                       
72 See, on the one hand, the contributions on European economic law in A. von Bogdandy & J. Bast (note 48 supra) 
by A. Haltje (―The Economic Constitution within the Internal Market), pp. 589-629, and J. Drexl (―Competition Law as 
Part of the European Constitution―), pp. 659-679, which are strongly indebted to the ordoliberal tradition, and M. 
Höpner & A. Schäfer, ―A New Phase of European Integration: Organized Capitalisms in Post-Ricardian Europe‖, 
(2010) 33 West European Politics, pp. 344-368, on the other. – Such theoretical controversies vary of course as 
strongly as Europe‘s varieties of capitalism. 
73 European Commission, ―White Paper to the European Council on Completion of the Internal Market‖, COM (85) 
310 final, 14 June 1985. 
74  M. Foucault,  Naissance  de  la  biopolitique.  Cours  au  Collège  de  France,  (Paris:  Seuil/Gallimard,  2004),  in 
particular the lecture of 7 February 1979, pp. 105-134, and that of 14 February 1979, pp. 135-164. 
75 ―… [A]u lieu d‘accepter une libert￩ du march￩, d￩finie par l‘État et maintenue en quelque sorte sur surveillance 
￩tatique… eh bien, disent les ordolib￩raux, il faut enti￨rement retourner la formule et se donner la libert￩ du march￩ 
comme principe organisateur et r￩gulateur de l‘État…Autrement dit, un État sous surveillance du marché plutôt 
qu‘un march￩ sous surveillance de l‘État‖, Biopolitique (note 7), Lecture 5, p. 120. 
76 See E.-J. Mestmäcker, Wirtschaft und Verfassung in der Europäischen Union. Beiträge zu Recht, Theorie und 
Politik der europäischen Integration, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2003), with a collection of essays written from 1965 to 
2001 and his recent critique of E. Posner in A legal theory without law Posner v. Hayek on Economic Analysis of 
Law, (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), also available at:   
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1168422. 
77  See  M.E.  Streit  &  W.  Mussler,  ―The  Economic  Constitution  of  the  European  Community.  From  ‗Rome‘  to 
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―modernisation‖  of European competition law
78 and the move towards a ―more economic 
approach‖.
79  The  weakening  of  their  ideational  power  was  symbolically  confirmed  when 
French Prime Minister Sarkozy saw to it that the Union‘s commitment to ―a system ensuring 
that competition is not distorted‖ was not included in Article 3 TFEU (ex Article 2 TEU) but 
moved back into Protocol 27 of the Treaty of Lisbon.
80 
III.2.3  Unity  without  Community?  J.H.H.  Weiler’s  Constitutional 
Complacency 
Joseph Weiler‘s early work can in hindsight be identified as truly path breaking in that it 
synthesised,  in  a  novel  way,  Europe‘s  constitutive  historical  move  towards  a  common 
peaceful  future,  the  construction  of  a  supranational  legal  alternative  to  the  role  of 
international law in the system, while remaining aware of the political embeddedness and 
dependency of these accomplishments. The great normative perspectives and the sensitive 
realism  in  his  design  of  an  equilibrium  between  ―legal  supranationalism‖  and  ―political 
intergovernmentalism‖, however, became gradually ever more apparent as Weiler sought to 
develop  his  construct  and  vision  further  in  the  light  of  European  experiences, 
accomplishments and failures. In his seminal article on the ―Transformation of Europe‖, he 
delivered an insightful diagnosis of the problematical implications of majority-voting in terms 
of  Europe‘s  legitimacy.
81  He  was  among  the  first  to  realise  the  normative  and  political 
ambivalences of the completion of the Internal Market by the Delors Commission: 
To  regard  the  Community  as  a  technological  instrument  is,  in  the  first  place,  to  under-
estimate the profound political choice and cultural impact which the single market involves – 
a politics of efficiency, a culture of market.
82 
We can summarise the forgoing observations in a second interim conclusion: the  impasses 
of  the  integration  praxis  are  mirrored  and  foreshadowed  by  the  exhaustion  of  the  main 
theoretical perspectives which have accompanied and oriented legal reflections, theoretical 
conceptualisations and the prescriptive modelling of Europe‘s finalité. Where practice and 
theory concur so significantly in their retractive moves, it seems about time to consider an 
alternative paradigm. 
                                                       
78 H. Schweitzer, ―Competition Law and Public Policy: Reconsidering an Uneasy Relationship: The Example of Art. 
81‖ (December 1, 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1092883. 
79 See D. Schmidtchen, M. Albert & Stefan Voigt (eds),  The More Economic Approach to European Competition 
Law, (Tübingern: Mohr Siebeck, 2007). 
80 Legally speaking, the removal looks insignificant, as, for example, Peter Behrens has underlined ―Der Wettbewerb 
im Vertrag von Lissabon”, (2008) 21 Europaische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, p. 193, the law‘s truth, however, is 
not the whole truth. 
81 J.H.H. Weiler, ―The Transformation of Europe‖ (note 31), at 2461 et seq. 
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IV.   Europe’s  Legitimacy  Problem  Revisited:  The  Conflicts 
Law Alternative 
Europe‘s  ―operational  code‖  is  to  prioritise  integration  ―over  all  other  conceivable  values 
including  democracy‖.
83  ―Unity  in  diversity‖,  the  motto  of  the  Constitutional  Treaty,  has 
become Majone‘s new leitmotiv.
84 The legal form of this motto is the re -conceptualisation of 
European law as a new type of supranational con flicts law. That approach, however, seeks 
to  open  much  broader  perspectives  than  Majone  envisages  in  his  plea  for  a  political 
modesty. Rather than repeating this argument once more,
85 commentary is here restricted to 
a depiction of its five core messages.
86 
IV.1.   Conflicts Law as Democratic Commandment 
The entire construction is built upon a sociological observation with normative implications. 
Under the impact of Europeanisation and globalisation, contemporary societies experience 
an ever stronger schism between decision-makers and those who are impacted upon by 
decision-making. This schism is explained by Niklas Luhmann within his sociological risk 
theory;  according  to  Luhmann,  the  problem  arises  because  decision-making  on  risks  is 
always characterised by the fact that the potential damage is not simply borne by individual 
decision-makers, and nor  is it only suffered  by  the  persons profiting from the decision.
87 
Luhmann‘s sociological observation is normatively disquieting in democratic orders. Suffice it 
here to point to Jürgen Habermas‘ first essay on European integration,
88 which he published 
prior to the completion of his discourse theory of law and democracy,
89 and later elaborated 
in greater detail:
90 increasingly, constitutional states are unable to guarantee the inclusion of 
all of those persons who are impacted upon by their policies and politics within their internal 
decision-making  processes.  The  democratic  notion  of  self -legislation,  however,  which 
                                                       
83 Majone, Europe as the Would-be World Power, (note 10), p. 1. 
84 Ibid., p. 205 et seq. 
85 For early versions, see Ch. Joerges, ―The Europeanisation of Private Law as a Rationalisation Process and as a 
Contest of Legal Disciplines  -- an Analysis of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts‖, (1995) 3 
European Review of Private Law, pp. 175-192; ―The Impact of European Integration on Private Law: Reductionist 
Perceptions, True Conflicts and a New Constitutionalist Perspective‖, (1997) 3 European Law Journal, pp. 378-406; 
―Deliberative Supranationalism‖ – A Defence‖, European Integration online Papers (EIoP); 5 (2001) No. 8, available 
at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2001-008a.htm. 
86 In the following I draw on Integration through Conflicts Law: On the Defence of the European Project by means of 
alternative conceptualisation of legal constitutionalisation, in: R. Nickel (ed) Conflict of Laws and Laws of Conflict in 
Europe and Beyond – Patterns of Supranational and Transnational Juridification, (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2010), pp. 
377-400. 
87 N. Luhmann, Soziologie des Risikos, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991); colourfully and laconically summarised in, 
for example, idem, Das Recht der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1995), pp. 141-143. 
88 J. Habermas, Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität (Citizenship and National Identity), (Zurich: Erkner, 1991). 
89 J. Habermas,  Faktizität und Geltung, (Frankfurt aM: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992), see Annex III therein in, idem, 
Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, (Cambridge MA: The MIT 
Press, 1998), pp. 491-516. 
90 J. Habermas, ―The European Nation State: On the Past and the Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship‖, in: idem, 
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postulates that the addressees of a law should  be  able to understand themselves as its 
authors, demands ―the inclusion of the other‖. 
IV.2.   The Supranationality of European Conflicts Law 
This plea for a new understanding of EU law, must not, the connotations of its terminological 
origin notwithstanding, serve as a retraction from supranationalism as such. Quite to the 
contrary, it furnishes a justification for the validity of the supranational jurisdiction – albeit one 
which is, just like the three models of legal integration theory discussed above,
91 at the same 
time depicting the limits of supranational rule. To rephrase its sociological and normative 
basis slightly: as a consequence of their manifold degree of inter -dependence, the Member 
States of the European Community/Union are no longer in a position to  guarantee the 
democratic  legitimacy  of  their  policies.  A  European  law  that  concerns  itself  with  the 
amelioration of such external effects,  i.e., which seeks to compensate for the failings of the 
national democracies, may induce its legitimacy from this compensatory function. With this, 
European law can, at last, free itself from the critique that has accompanied it since its birth; 
a critique that states that it is not legitimate. It can thus operate to strengthen democracy 
within  a  contractual  understanding  of  statehood,  without  needing  to  establish  itself  as  a 
democratic state.
92 
                                                       
91 Sections II.1-3 and III.2. 
92  The argument has been taken up or reinvented repeatedly: see, for example, R. Howse, & K. Nicolaïdis, 
―Democracy without Sovereignty: The Global Vocation of Political Ethics‖, in: T. Broude & Y. Shany (eds),  The 
Shifting Allocation of Authority in International Law. Considering Sovereignty, Supremacy and Subsidiarity, (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2008), 163-191; K.-H. Ladeur, ―The State in International Law‖, in: Ch. Joerges & J. Falke (eds), 
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Through Freedom of Movement‖, (2010) 16 European Law Journal, pp. 315-344; ―The Argument from Transnational 
Effects II: Establishing Transnational Democracy‖, (2010) 16 European Law Journal, pp. 375-394. It will become 
apparent from our exemplary discussion in Sections V and VI that, in our understanding, Part I of Somek‘s argument 
fails to acknowledge the conflicts-law framework of the argument, which is ―emebedded‖ in the Habermasian notion 
of the ―co-originality‖ of private and public autonomy; the whole point of the conflicts approach is about the defence 
of co-originality against the supremacy of ―economic freedoms‖ (see Section V.1 infra and the references in note 
102); Part II of the argument seeks to take the interdependence problématique too lightly. As F. Rödl has recently 
put it: ―The border-crossing interdependence of national societies generates types of problems that can no longer be 
solved by the States on their own or through their consensual cooperation, but require a unitary political space that 
corresponds to the continental or even global scope of the problems‖ (―Democratic Juridification without Statization: 
Law of Conflict of Laws instead of a World State‖, Ms. Frankfurt aM 2010; on file with the author); see also his 
―Regime-Collisions, Proceduralised Conflict of Laws and the Unity of the Law: On the Form of Constitutionalism 
Beyond the State‖, in R. Nickel, Conflict of Laws, (note 84 supra), 263-278. – To argue that the conflicts approach 
conceptualises the interdependence problem adequately is not to suggest, however, that it would generate good 
answers to all true conflicts – see Section IV.2.3 infra. Also, to refer to Habermas is not to suggest that the discourse 
theory of law has a privileged access to a query which is raised by others, lawyers and political theorists alike, in 
similar ways; see N. Nic Shuibhne, “The Resilience of market citizenship‖, forthcoming in Common Market Law 
Review, and R. Bellamy, ―The liberty of the post-moderns? Market and civic freedom within the EU‖, LEQS paper 
No. 01/2009, available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/LEQS/LEQSPapers.aspx. For a summary of the 
constitutional  debate  since  Maastricht  and  a  critical  analysis  of  the  ―social  surplus‖  of  the  ECJ‘s  social  rights-
jurisprudence see M. Everson, ―European Citizenship and the Dillusion of the Common Man‖, in: R. Nickel, Conflict 
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IV.3.   Convergence, Re-construction, Critique 
Clearly, such a democratic exoneration of European law is only plausible to the exact degree 
that  it  may  be  re-constructed  within  this  perspective,  or  that  it  may  be  furnished  with  a 
conflicts-law orientation. This, however, is already, often enough, the case: European law 
has  given  legal  force  to  principles  and  rules  which  serve  the  purpose  of  supranational 
―recognition‖  –  the  non-discrimination  principle,  the  supranational  definition  and  the 
demarcation of legitimate regulatory concerns, the demands for justification for actions that 
are imposed upon national legal systems, and the proportionality principle – which supplies a 
legal  yardstick  against  which  respect  for  supranationally-guaranteed  freedoms  may  be 
measured  –  and  the  demand  that  all  public  exercise  of  power  pays  due  regard  to 
fundamental rights. All these principles and rules may be understood as a concretisation of a 
supranational  conflicts  law,  which  guarantees  that  the  actions  of  the  Member  States  are 
reconcilable with their position within the Community. This is not to say, however, that the 
solutions to the conflicts at which European law has actually arrived, are always convincing. 
Our re-construction of European law in the normative perspectives just outlined will reveal 
tensions between ―‖facticity‖ and ―validity‖, as well as failures and missed opportunities – the 
conflicts approach shares this type of experience with the three approaches which it seeks to 
replace. 
IV.4.   Internal  Differentiation  of  Conflicts  Law  within  Europe’s  Multi-
level System: the Idea of a Three–dimensional Conflicts Law 
The metaphor of the multi-level system asserts that European ―rule‖ cannot be organised 
hierarchically. This argument is reflected, not only within the apportionment of competences 
within the EU, but also by the fact that vast discrepancies exist in the operational resources 
available at each ruling level. Accordingly, we are able to distinguish between three forms of 
legal collision – vertical, ―diagonal‖ and horizontal. Diagonal collisions are an important and 
unique feature of multi-level systems. They are a constant feature of life within the EU, since 
the competences required for problem-solving are, at times, to be found at the level of the 
EU itself, and, at other times, at the level of the Member States. This division of competences 
gives rise to two forms of potential conflict – on the one hand, between divergent EU and 
national political orientations, and, on the other, between divergent interest constellations in 
the Member States – so that very particular mediation arrangements must be identified. This 
need for mediation is true for all multi-level systems, but is particularly pressing in the case of 
the EU, where the existence of diagonal conflict has had, as its corollary, the evolution of a 
particularly intense degree of administrative co-operation, the institutionalisation of advice-
giving  instances,  and  the  systematic  construction  of  non-governmental  co-operative 
relationships. This infrastructure may be understood as furnishing the integral components of 
a  conflicts  law,  a  law  that  may  no  longer  restrict  itself  to  the  individual  adjudication  of 
situational cases of conflict, and which must, instead, constantly busy itself with the finding of 
general  solutions  to  universal  problems.  At  the  same  time,  such  conflicts  law  must  be 
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post-interventionist regulatory practices and legal forms within national law. Accordingly, we 
may  identify  three  types  of  European  conflicts  law,  which  operate  in  three  dimensions:
93 
conflicts law of the ―first order‖ is flanked, on the one hand, by a conflicts law, which, most 
specifically in the realm of European comitology, has concerned itself with the elaboration of 
material (substantive) regulatory options, and, on the other hand, by a conflicts law, which 
governs the supervision of para-legal law and self-regulatory organisation. 
IV.5.   Conflicts Law as Proceduralising Constitutionalism 
It follows from the preceding sections that it would be factually and normatively mistaken to 
regard  European  law  as  a  system  of  law  dedicated  to  the  incremental  construction  of  a 
comprehensive legal edifice. Europe must, at last, take the motto of the Draft Constitutional 
Treaty
94 to heart, and learn to accept the fact that its diversity will accompany it far into the 
future, so that conflict born of diversity will continue to characterise the process of European 
integration. It must further concede that this ―process‖ should be overseen by a conflicts law, 
which,  by  virtue  of  its  identification  of  the  principles  and  rules  that  govern  conflict,  will 
generate  the  law  of  the  European  multi-level  system.  Europeanisation  is  not  simply  a 
process of change; it is also a learning process. Law cannot pre-determine the substance of 
such  processes,  but  may  yet  secure  its  own  normative  character,  by  virtue  of  its  self-
dedication to the processes of law-making(Recht-Fertigung), which mirror and defend the 
justice and fairness within law.
95 This understanding is by no means simply some Teutonic 
idiosyncrasy.
96 It is akin to, for example, Antje Wiener‘s notion of ―the invisible constitution‖
97 
or Deirdre Curtin‘s concept of the ―living constitution‖.
98 Should it be that these daring ideas 
are the realistic in the sense that they represent the onbly conceivable type of responses to 
the challenges to which the European project is exposed. In his comments on the conflicts 
                                                       
93 See, for more detail, Ch. Joerges & F. Rödl, ―Zum Funktionswandel des Kollisionsrechts II: Die kollisionsrechtliche 
Form einer legitimen Verfassung der post-nationalen Konstellation‖, in: G.-P. Calliess et al. (eds), Soziologische 
Jurisprudenz: Festschrift für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2009, pp. 765-778; 
Ch. Joerges, ―The Idea of a Three-dimensional Conflicts Law as Constitutional Form‖, in: Ch. Joerges &  E.-U. 
Petersmann  (eds),  Constitutionalism,  Multilevel  Trade  Governance  and  International  Economic  Law,  2nd  ed. 
(Oxford:  Hart  Publishing,  forthcoming;  also  available  at: 
www.reconproject.eu/projectweb/portalproject/RECONWorkingPapers.html. For similar terminological usage, though 
built upon a different conceptual base, see P. F. Kjaer, ―Three-dimensional Conflict of Laws in Europe‖, ZERP-DP 
2/2009, available at: http://www.zerp.uni-bremen.de/; see, also, P.F. Kjaer (note 62 supra), p. 141 et seq. 
94 Article I-8 Draft European Constitutional Treaty (note  1 supra). The formula was dispensed with by the Lisbon 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
95  See  R.  Wiehölter,  ―Just-ifications  of  a  Law  of  Society‖,  in:  O.  Perez  &  G.  Teubner,  (eds),  Paradoxes  and 
Inconsistencies  in  the  Law,  (Oxford:  Hart  Publishing,  2005),  pp.  65-77,  available  at:  http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/ifawz1/teubner/RWTexte/justum.pdf.  
96 See M. Everson & J. Eisner, The Making of the EU Constitution: Judges and Lawyers Beyond Constitutive Power, 
(Milton Park: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), in particular, p. 41 et seq. 
97 A. Wiener,  The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
98 D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union. Law, Practices and the Living Constitution, (Oxford: Oxford 
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law  approach  Andrea  Greppi  has  identified  these  difficulties  with  radical  clarity.
99  The 
proceduralisation of law risks to forego all substance, in particular a commitment to social 
justice. Its openness and plea for deliberative problem solving risks to be seized by the logic 
of  technocratic  managerialism. To  summarize  these  concerns  and  hopes  in  a  citation: 
―Whether  intentionally  or  unintentionally,  legal  theory  and  philosophy  suggest  that  they 
contain a remedial potential which in fact they lack, and necessarily must lack, to the extent 
that they fail to incorporate the inchoate values of individuals and institutions in society, the 
phenomenon Ernst Cassirer called the ‗constitution that is written in the citizens‘ minds‘‖.
100 
                                                       
99   ―Procedure and substance in postnational constitutionalism: Montesquieu or Sieyes?‖, contribution to the 
workshop ―The changing role of law in the age of supra- and transnational governance‖ (note * supra; on file with 
author). 
100   V. Grosswald Curran, ―Law‘s Past and Europe‘s Future‖, (2005) 6 German Law Journal, pp. 483-512, at 
486, available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com. The reference is to E. Cassirer‘s posthumously published The 
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V.   the Deepening of Europe’s Legitimacy Problem by the 
ECJ’s Labour Law Jurisprudence 
As indicated, the conflicts-law approach is not meant as an artificial juxtaposition to positive 
European  law,  but  it  does  claim  to  take  up  the  legacy  of  legal  realism,  and,  hence,  to 
articulate that laws ―real life‖. This, however, is by no means a purely affirmative exercise. 
Both of the case studies in the following sections will use the approach to raise objections or 
to articulate reserves against important decisions of the ECJ. 
V.1.   The Example of Cassis de Dijon 
The  conflicts-law  approach  advocates  mitigation  between  controversies  over  diverging 
policies  and  complex  interest  configuration.  With  this  aspiration,  the  approach  departs 
markedly from the traditional treatment of public law provisions in private international law, 
international public and administrative law. Europe has, as Jona Israël put it, the chance and 
vocation to transform the comitas (voluntary and diplomatic co-ordination) among its states 
and societies into a legally-binding commitment to co-operative problem-solving.
101 This has 
been accomplished in countless cases  – more or less convincingly. The ECJ‘s legendary 
Cassis de Dijon judgment of 1979
102 may serve to illustrate this point. The ECJ‘s response to 
the controversy between Germany and France over Germany‘s prescriptions on a minimum 
percentage of alcohol in liquor was as plausible as it was trifling: the confusion of German 
consumers  could  be  avoided,  and  a  reasonable  degree  of  protection  against  erroneous 
decisions by German consumers could be achieved by simply disclosing the lower alcohol 
content of the competing French liqueur. 
Damian Chalmers and Agustìn José Menéndez have raised objections of different weight. As 
Chalmers  rightly  underlines,  the  ―centre  of  gravity‖  of  the  case  was  in  Germany  and 
concerned conflicts of interest between a German distributor (REWE) and German liquor 
producers.
103  This is so, but it does not affect the involvement of the ECJ in a conflict 
constellation which is  within  the  European  multi-level  system.  Chalmers‘  critique  touches 
upon the upgrading of economic freedoms to constitutional rights which entitle those affected 
to a supervision of national legislation by the ECJ. This move of the ECJ was anything but 
trivial, because the Court has assumed en passant constitutionalising functions. This kind of 
power is inherent in any supranational supervision of national public law. Its constitutional 
sensitivity  becomes  apparent  when  we  re-construct  the  issue  in  the  framework  of  the 
discourse theory of law. Economic freedoms belong to the sphere of private autonomy and 
deserve  recognition  as  constitutional  rights.  However,  within  consolidated  constitutional 
democracies,  the  recognition  of  the  constitutional  status  of  the  private  sphere  is 
                                                       
101 J. Israël, European Cross-Border Insolvency Regulation, (Antwerp-Oxford: Intersentia, 2005), pp 123, 150-152, & 
323-334. 
102 Case 120/78, ECR [1979] 649. 
103 ―Deliberative Supranationalism and the Reterritorialization of Authority‖, in: B. Kohler-Koch & B. Rittberger (eds), 
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complemented  by  the  constitutional  recognition  and  protection  of  political  rights.  Both 
spheres must be understood in the conceptualisation of Jürgen Habermas as ―co-original‖.
104 
The issue, then, is of whether the ECJ has gone a step too far when complementing the 
recognition of the constitutional status of economic freedoms by its authoritative definition of 
the  kind  of  concerns  which  are  deemed  to  be  compatible  with  the  establishment  of  a 
common European market. It is this latter query to which Menéndez refers in his critique of 
the constitutional ambitions of the conflicts-law approach.
105 This point is well taken,
106 but it 
does in no way affect the reading of Cassis as a conflicts law case. The ECJ handed down a 
ruling on a complex conflict constellation. This ruling does provide a legal framework for this 
conflict. This ―is‖ conflicts law, albeit not necessarily good law.
107 
V.2.   A  Market  Community?  The  ECJ’s  Recent  Labour  Law 
Jurisprudence 
The much-debated recent labour law jurisprudence of the ECJ provides a line of cases in 
point. It is difficult for anybody aware of continental private and public international law or 
Anglo-Saxon conflict of laws not to realise the discrepancies between the latter disciplines 
and the decisions which the ECJ handed down under European law. This is not, in itself, 
deplorable. What deserves closer scrutiny, however, is the contents of the principles and 
rules which the ECJ has invoked and developed in its responses to the conflict constellations 
which were referred to it. 
                                                       
104 J. Habermas has developed this notion in the context of his theory of democratic constitutionalism; see his 
Between Facts and Norms (note 89 supra), p. 118 et seq. Very convincingly, in my view, Rainer Nickel and Florian 
Rödl have suggested its application ―beyond the state‖: see R Nickel, ―Private and Public Autonomy Revisited: 
Jürgen  Habermas‘  Concept  of  Co-Originality  in  Times  of  Globalisation  and  the  Militant  Security  State‖,  in:  M. 
Loughlin & N. Walker (eds), The Paradox of Constitutionalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 147-
167; F. Rödl, ―Private Law Beyond the Democratic Order? On the Legitimatory Problem of Private Law ‗Beyond the 
State‘‖, (2008) 56 American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 743-768. 
105  See A.J.  Men￩ndez,  ―When the market  is  political: The  socio-economic  constitution  of  the European  Union 
between  market-making  and  polity-making‖,  in:  R.  Letelier  &  A..J.  Men￩ndez  (eds),  The  Sinews  of  Peace. 
Reconstituting the Democratic Legitimacy of the Socio-Economic Constitution of the European Union, Oslo: ARENA, 
pp. 39-62 (RECON Report 10, pp. 39.62, available at:   
http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECONreport0910.pdf?fileitem=29736964). 
106 See, a good while ago, E. Steindorff, ―Probleme des Art. 30 EWG‖, (1984) 148  Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Handelsrecht und Wirtschaftsrecht, pp. 338-355. 
107 There is no space in this lengthy essay to review related approaches which share this insight. G. Conways Ph.D 
Thesis on ―Values and Conflicts of Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice‖ 
(Brunel 2010), however, deserves exceptional treatment [see, also, his ―Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law 
and  the  Legal  Reasoning  of  the  ECJ‖,  (2010)  11  German  Law  Journal,  pp.  966-1005  (2010),  available  at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1280].  With  his  notion  of  ―conflict  of  norms‖, 
Conway has chosen a term which, very fortunately, avoids connotations and confusion which the ―conflicts law‖ 
approach tends to provoke. Conway also does not engage extensively in constitutional deliberations. It is all the 
more  remarkable  and  enlightening  that  his  analyses  documents  –  the  avoidance  of  ther  term  ny  the  ECJ 
notwithstanding (see page 185, note 333) – the omnipresence of conflicts and the need for legal responses in all 
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V.2.1  Viking, Laval, Rüffert 
These three cases are, by now, so well-known that it should suffice here to summarise their 
contents very briefly. 
The first case was decided on 11 December 2007.
108 Finnish seafarers, employed on the 
ferry Rosella, become aware of the intention of their employer to flag out to Estonia. Since 
they ware afraid of loosing their jobs or being forced to accept lower wages, they tried to 
impress their employer by threatening to strike. This was legal under Finnish law. But, so 
their Finnish employer argued, such action was incompatible with its right Viking‘s right of 
free establishment as then enshrined in Article 43 EC. 
The response of the ECJ is conciliatory in its tone, but is, in fact, quite rigid. The ECJ starts 
out with underlining that the ―right to take collective action, including the right to strike … [is] 
a  fundamental  right  which  forms  an  integral  part  of  the  general  principles  of  Community 
law‖.
109  Then,  however,  the  Court  fundamentally  re-configures  the  traditional  balance 
between economic freedoms at European level and social rights at national level, explaining 
that the Member States, although ―still free, in principle, to lay down the conditions governing 
the  existence  and  exercise  of  the  rights  in  question…must  nevertheless  comply  with 
Community law […]. Consequently, the fact that Article 137 EC does not apply to the right to 
strike or to the right to impose lock-outs is not such as to exclude collective action such as 
that at issue in the main proceedings from the application of Article 43 EC‖. 
The second case was decided only one week later.
110 Laval, a company incorporated under 
Latvian  law,  had  won  the  tender  for  a  school  building  on  the  outskirts  of  Stockholm.  In 
obtaining the tender, it had profited from the differences in the wage levels of Latvia and 
Sweden. In May 2004, when work was to start, and after Laval had posted several dozens of 
its workers, the Swedish trade unions resorted to hostile actions against  Laval with such 
determination and intensity that Laval gave up. 
The Unions had acted legally according to Swedish law, but the Court referred to Directive 
96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services.
111 
This Directive requires, with respect to a number of essential working conditions, that foreign 
workers are not to be disadvantaged. According to Article 3, workers are to be guaranteed 
the minimum rates of pay. According to the general principle of the same Article, the rates of 
pay must be laid down either ―by law, regulation or administrative provision‖ or ―by collective 
                                                       
108 Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP, OÜ 
Viking Line Eesti, judgment of 11 December 2007, [2007] ECR I-10779. 
109 Case C-438/05 (Viking), para 44. 
110  Case  C -341/05,  Laval  un  Partneri  Ltd  v  Svenska  Byggnadsarbetareförbundet,  Svenska 
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agreements  which  have  been  declared  universally  applicable  within  the  meaning  of 
paragraph 8‖. Sweden, however, had refrained from changing its pertinent laws but relied on 
the exceptions listed in Article 3 Paragraph 8 (providing therein the absence of a system for 
declaring  collective  agreements  or  arbitration  awards  universally  applicable.  It  left  the 
determination of wage levels to collective agreements concluded among the undertakings 
themselves. The Court argued that, in this respect, Sweden was in breach of (secondary) 
Community law.
112 
In the third judgment, which was handed down on April 2008, the ECJ further entrenched its 
position.
113 Rüffert concerned the legality of a tender proffered by one of the German Länder, 
Lower Saxony, which contained a clause indicating that the public authorities were bound to 
respect  existing  collective-bargaining  agreements,  so  that  tendering  firms  would  also  be 
required to abide by the relevant collective-bargaining agreements. The ECJ held that Lower 
Saxony‘s legislation was irreconcilable with Article 49 EC since it prevented foreign service-
providers from benefiting from lower wage costs within their country of origin. 
The vital point within the judgment is its evaluation of the protective purpose of the clause 
committing the public authorities to respect collective agreements: in this respect, the Court 
held  that  ―contrary  to  the  contentions  of  Land  Niedersachsen  and  a  number  of  the 
Governments,  such  a  measure  cannot  be  considered  to  be  justified  by  the  objective  of 
ensuring the protection of workers‖. 
This finding is all the more remarkable in view of a prior pertinent decision of Germany‘s 
Constitutional Court, which had explained only in 2006:
 114 
The combating of unemployment, together with measures that secure the financial stability of 
the social security system, are particularly important goals, for the realisation of which the 
legislator must be given a relatively large degree of decisional discretion, and especially so 
under current, politically very difficult, labour market conditions.
 115 
V.2.2  Dissenting Opinions in Luxembourg and their Disregard 
In  all  of  the  three  cases,  the  Court‘s  Advocate  Generals  –  Poiares  Maduro  in  Viking, 
Mengozzi  in Laval,  Bot in Rüffert – had submitted  Opinions  which differed,  more or less 
significantly,  from  the  Court‘s  later  judgments.  In  two  more  recent  cases,  the  signals  of 
dissent were becoming stronger and more articulate. 
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The first case concerns the applicability of Directive 2004/18 on a German pension scheme 
for public employees, and has considerable affinities with Rüffert.
116 The German scheme 
foresaw the involvement of Trade Unions in the transformation of parts of their remuneration 
into pensions (Entgeltumwandlung). The European Commission found the involvement of 
the trade unions in the selection of insurers to be compatible with the Directive. 
The opinion which AG Verica Trstenjak delivered on 14 April 2010 does not directly question 
the Court‘s labour law jurisprudence.
117 She explicitly refrains from supporting Germany‘s 
quest for an ―Albany exclusion‖,
118 and confirms the applicability of the economic freedoms. 
She then adds, however, that the social right to collective bargaining and the freedoms are of 
equal weight and invokes the principle of proportionality as a guide for its resolution.
119 The 
conflict is to be resolved at the level of primary law and that resolution has then to guide the 
interpretation  of  secondary  legislation.  This  leads  her  to  question  the  validity  of  the 
Commission‘s  reading  of  the  said  Directive  and  to  suggest  that  the  complaint  be 
dismissed.
120 
The second case concerns the compatibility of Belgian requirements relating to the posting 
of workers in Belgium with the Posted Workers Directive.
121 It is, in this respect, closer to 
Laval.  GA  Cruz  Villalón,  in  his  opinion  of  5  May  2010,  characterises  this  directive  as  a 
response to the conflicts between social values and economic freedoms which the internal 
market  is  bound  to  generate,
122  and then complements t he argument of his Slovenian 
colleague by a reference to Articles 9 and 3 TFEU, suggesting that, under Treaty of Lisbon, 
social protection is no longer to be understood as an exception from the economic freedoms, 
but as commitment of general validity. Like his colleague, he then invokes the proportionality 
principle to resolve these tensions.
123 
The two Opinions move the conflict between economic freedoms and social rights to the 
European  level  and  thereby  strengthen  Europe‘s  judicial  supranationalism.  The  premises 
and implications of this projection are difficult to understand. Both cases concern policy fields 
in  which  national  law  has  not  been  replaced,  but  is  only  partially  affected  by  European 
prerogatives. The prospects for a clarification of such queries, however, do not seem bright. 
In its judgement of 15 July 2010 the ECJ (Grand Chamber) rather flatly rephrases what has 
been stated in Viking and Laval: 
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While  it  is  true  that  the  right  to  bargain  collectively  enjoys  in  Germany  the  constitutional 
protection conferred, generally, by Article 9(3) of the German Basic Law upon the right to 
form  associations  to  safeguard  and  promote  working  and  economic  conditions,  the  fact 
remains  that,  as  provided  in  Article  28  of  the  Charter,  that  right  must  be  exercised  in 
accordance with European Union law. 
Exercise of the fundamental right to bargain collectively must therefore be reconciled with 
the requirements stemming from the freedoms protected by the FEU Treaty, which in the 
present  instance  Directives  92/50  and  2004/18  are  intended  to  implement,  and  be  in 
accordance with the principle of proportionality.
124 
V.3.   The Conflicts Law Alternative 
What is wrong about all this? There is no space here to comment on the European wide 
discussion of this jurisprudence. The following remarks will be restricted to some aspects 
which illuminate the specifics of the conflicts law approach. 
V.3.1  Sweden’s Social Democratic Sonderweg 
Patricia Mindus
125 has, after her review of social and legal integration theories, turned to a 
dimension  of the  Laval  case  which  she  is  extremely  well-equipped  to  take  up  in  such 
sophistication:  The  Laval  litigation  does  indeed  illustrate  aspects  of  ―the  Swedish 
Sonderweg‖ such as the legal status and social function of kollektivavtalssystemet which the 
Swedish legislature did not want to (dare to?) touch when implementing the Posted Workers 
Directive.  She  argues  very  convincingly  that  the  ―Swedish  model‖  is,  by  now,  politically 
contested,  and  not  only  under  pressure  exerted  by  some  ―kleptomaniac  competence 
extension‖ of the ECJ. In a conflicts law language, Sweden has to become aware of the 
tensions between its Sonderweg and its European commitments. The Union and its highest 
Court must defend these commitments which are, at the same time, Community entitlements 
– and also be aware of the instrumentalization of European law and court proceedings in 
internal Swedish power battles
126 – the Laval case was, after all, initiated and financed in 
Sweden.
127 This is an instructive explanation of the background and the implication of Laval. 
It  is  also,  at  the  same  time,  an  instructive  illustration  of  the  conflict  patterns  which  the 
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Europeanisation process generates. This observation confirms the assertion that European 
law ―is‖ conflicts law. But is Laval ―good conflicts law‖? The constellation is structurally the 
same as in Cassis de Dijon,
128 but so much more dramatic. The message of the conflicts-law 
approach is seemingly abstract: the law should civilise the contest over divergent policies 
and interests without assuming the mandate to streamline Europe‘s diversity. 
V.3.2  Conflicts Law’s Prudence 
―Judicial restraint‖ v. ―judicial activism‖ is a misleading dichotomy here, and does not at all 
exhaust the potential of the traditions on which the conflicts-law approach builds. 
Antoine Lyon-Caen, the doyen of French labour law, has, without resorting to the conflict of 
law or private international law terminology recalled one core message: 
Dans les soci￩t￩s d‘Europe de l‘Ouest, le droit du travail s‘est constitu￩ par émancipation du 
droit du march￩, d￩nomm￩ moyennant les variations terminologiques qu‘il importe de ne pas 
oublier: libert￩ du commerce ici, freedom of trade ailleurs… Ce n‘est pas que des r￨gles sur 
le travail n‘existaient pas avant cette ￩mancipation, mais elles relevaient d‘avantage d‘une 
police du travail, partie plus ou moins autonome d‘une police du ou des march￩s.
129 
There is a categorical difference between economic law and labour law, Lyon-Caen argues. 
The most basic notion which conflicts law has at its disposal  is ―characterisation‖
130 and, 
Ernst  Rabel‘s  universalist  visions  notwithstanding,  characterisation  has,  according  to  the 
prevailing view, to take the views of the forum seriously. The categorical difference is not 
written in stone and not pre-given as some transpositive ordo, but deeply rooted, albeit in a 
variety of forms, in the history of industrial and democratised societies. 
The European law parallel is the principle of enumerated competences. Awareness of this 
parallel is no longer widespread among European law scholars. This is unfortunate because 
the sensitivity of the elder discipline for the specifics of legal fields although provides some 
                                                       
128 See Section V.1 supra. 
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guidance in the interpretation of such opaque provisions as Article 137 (5) EC (now 153 (5) 
TFEU).
131 
The  prudence  suggested  by  conflicts  law  coincides  with  what  we  have  noted  in  our 
references to the discourse theory of law and democracy.
132  What the ECJ did in the 
perspective of this theory was to disregard the autonomy and co -originality of private and 
political autonomy, and to assign supremacy to economic freedoms over political citizenship. 
The conflicts law approach does, of course, pretend to have delivered an elaborated re -
construction of this inter -dependence at European level. What its understanding of the 
constitutionalisation strongly suggests, however, is to respect the variety in Europe‘s social 
models  and  to  promote  their  co-ordination  in  the  light  of  practical  experiences.  It  seems 
perfectly justified to further the efforts of the new Member States to exploit their competitive 
advantages. It is by no means plausible, however, that ―direct wage competition‖
133 would 
signal and achieve solidarity with these countries, and further both the prosperity within, and 
distributional justice among, Europe‘s diverse regions. It may be that, through the opening of 
the Western Markets for cheap labour, we foreclose the chances for accession states to 
build  up  their  own  social  model.  Should  we  really  assume  that  the  Swedish  employer 
organisations seek to give a hand to the development of Estonia by the kind of strategies 
they pursued with Laval and the financing of the lengthy litigation in that case? European law 
should know more about the social price to be paid for the bringing of cheap labour to Old 
Europe before engaging in the flattening of Europe‘s diversity.
134 
―Restraint‖ v. ―activism‖ is not the proper frame for these issues. The type of prudence which 
the conflicts law approach requires is as at least as demanding, but not identical with, what 
we expect from the constitutional courts of consolidated nation states or federations in their 
supervision of legislation. To this issue, we will have to return. 
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VI.   Conflicts  Law  or  Community  Method?  Responses  to 
Upper Austria’s Concerns with Atomic Energy 
The  protection  of  ―health  and  life  of  humans,  animals  and  plants‖  was  mentioned  as  a 
legitimate regulatory concern in Article 36 EEC Treaty and complemented by the recognition 
of environmental protection as a matter of ―general interest‖ in the aftermath of Cassis de 
Dijon. Environmental issues are, indeed, the best conceivable case for the theoretical and 
normative  core  of  the  conflicts-law  approach.  Nowhere  is  it  more  evident  that  national 
decision-making  has  external  effects,  and  that  those  affected  in  another  territory  are 
regularly excluded from domestic decision-making processes. Nowhere does it seem more 
plausible to establish a transnational regime with the potential to correct such failures Last, 
but  not  least,  environmental  issues  are,  often  enough,  of  such  political  sensitivity  that  it 
makes  sense  to  insist  on  the  kind  of  horizontally-inclusive  constitutionalism  which  the 
conflicts law advocates. 
European law and pertinent theoretical conceptualisations were, for a long time, far from 
respecting  such  insights.  The  unanimity  rule  governed  in  environmental  policies.  Political 
scientists provided us with the distinction of product and process regulation which seemed to 
rationalise  the  autonomy  of  national  preference-building.  However,  since  Maastricht, 
environmental  protection  has  become  a  commitment  of  constitutional  dignity  –  and  has 
retained this status ever since.
135 
It should hence be easy to provide plausible evidence militating in favour of our claim that 
the  conflicts-law  approach  is  not  something  external  to  the  in tegration  project,  but  a 
dimension of it which can be re -constructed  in  Europe‘s  political  and  legal  development. 
However,  the  discussion  here  will  be  restricted  to  one  recent  example  of  particular 
sensitivity, namely, the litigation over the Temelín nuclear power plant, between its operator 
ČEZ,  a  power-supply  undertaking  in  the  Czech  Republic,  and  the  Austrian  Land  of 
Oberösterreich, owner of a piece of land located at a distance of just 60 km from Temelín. 
The Temelin saga had two main stages. 
VI.1.   Case C-343/04: Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ 
The Temelín nuclear plant was authorised by Czecheslovakian authorities back in 1985, and 
was  brought  into  operation  upon  a  trial  basis  and  has,  since  2003,  been  working  at  full 
capacity. 
The Austrians complained about ionising radiation emanating from the plant. They framed 
their complaint in private law categories and the controversy was hence, at this first stage, 
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fought out as a genuine horizontal conflict under the pertinent rules of private international 
law and the jurisdictional provisions of the Brussels Convention of 1968. 
The Land Oberösterreich brought its action before the Landgericht Linz, seeking an order 
that ČEZ put an end to the actual or potential nuisance relating to the  ionising radiation 
potentially emanating from the Temelín power plant, in so far as they exceeded those to be 
expected  from  a  nuclear  power  station  operated  in  accordance  with  current  generally-
recognised  technological  standards.  Upper  Austria  based  this  request  upon  the  actio 
negatoria of § 364 (2) of the Austrian Civil Code.
136 AG Poiares Maduro, in his opinion of 11 
January 2006, and the ECJ, in its judgment of  18 May 2006,
137  therefore turned to the 
pertinent provisions of the Convention. They hence asked: Are rights in rem at issue here so 
that  the  Austrian  courts  can  invoke  Article  16  of  the  Convention  and  claim  exclusive 
jurisdiction?  Is  this  matter,  instead,  to  be  qualified  as  a  tort  in  the  sense  of  Article  5  III 
governed by the lex loci delicti? (―the place where the harmful event occurred‖). 
The answer given by the ECJ to the question so framed sounds plausible: 
―... it cannot be considered that an action such as that pending before the national court 
should in general be decided according to the rules of one State rather than the other and in 
conclusion: this is no case of exclusive Austrian in rem jurisdiction.‖
138 
Plausible as it sounds, one remains puzzled: If Austrian standards must not govern, does it 
follow that the defendant can operate the plant according to the standards of the Czech 
Republic  without  regard  for  the  Austrian  concerns?  That  would  constitute  a  democracy 
failure of the type described above.
139 AG Poiares Maduro, in one of his scholarly opinions, 
was digging much deeper: the courts of both interested states should be able to claim 
exclusive  jurisdiction  for  the  analysis  of  the  statutory  restrictions  on  ownership  over 
immovable property located  in their respective territories.
140 This, however, implies that the 
risk of conflicting judgments.
141 ―In such cases the judgment to be delivered must pay special 
attention to the transnational character of the situation.‖
142 This may sound a bit sibylline, but 
indicates, in fact, the need for a conflicts law response: 
―If the national legal system allows the protection of property either through a property rule or 
a liability rule, the transnational dimension of the case and the possible difficulty of making a 
                                                       
136 § 364 (2) of the Austrian Civil Code states: ―The owner of land may prohibit his neighbour from producing effects, 
emanating from the latter‘s land, by effluent, smoke, gases, heat, odours, noise, vibration and the like, in so far as 
they exceed normal local levels and significantly interfere with the usual use of the land. Direct transmission, without 
a specific legal right, is unlawful in all circumstances.‖ 
137 [2006] ECR I-04557. 
138 Case C-343/04, para. 36. 
139 Section IV.1. 
140 Para 90. 
141 Para 91. 
142 Para 93. 36 — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — I H S 
 
 
full cost-benefit analysis may be relevant to such a choice. Secondly, the same concern for 
the consideration of the transnational character of the situation may be relevant in seeking a 
balance of all relevant elements with respect to the assessment of the amount of damage or 
the assessment of the risk that such damage may occur.‖
143 
The ECJ found a quite comfortable way out, explaining merely that Austria cannot claim 
exclusive jurisdiction. This was only a preliminary end of the saga‘s first chapter. 
VI.2.   Case C-115/08: Land Oberösterreich v ČEZ a.s. 
The  Czech  Republic  and Austria  have  apparently  taken  Maduro‘s  advice  seriously.  Both 
states  ―declared  that  they  would  fulfil  the  series  of  bilateral  obligations,  including  safety 
measures, monitoring free movement rights and the development of energy partnerships, set 
out in a document known as ‗The Conclusions of the Melk Process and Follow-Up‘, which 
was concluded in November 2001‖.
144 
VI.2.1   The Shadow of Weber over Austria’s Oberster Gerichtshof 
But this agreement did not stop Upper Austria from pursuing its complaint further. In April 
2006, they obtained a judgment from the Oberster Gerichtshof, which was based upon the 
exception from § 364 (2) adopted in § 364a. This provision reads: 
―However, if the interference is caused, in excess of that level, by a mining installation or an 
officially authorised installation on the neighbouring land, the landowner is entitled only to 
bring court proceedings for compensation for the damage caused, even where the damage 
is caused by circumstances which were not taken into account in the official authorisation 
process.‖ 
The Austrian Court‘s is as traditional as it is interesting in the reasons stated for the refusal 
to recognise the authorisation of the Czech plant. Such authorisations, the Court explained 
have to weigh conflicting considerations and interests. This weighing, however, occurred in a 
foreign jurisdiction, and there was hence ―no reason why Austrian law should restrict the 
property rights of Austrian landowners purely in the interests of protecting a foreign economy 
and public interests in another country‖.
145 This can be read as a tribute to the political nature 
of decisions on high-risk activities and the need for a democratic basis of such decisions. A 
principled refusal of Austrian courts to recognise the legitimacy of foreign authorisation is a 
blatant breach of European commitments. Unsurprisingly, both the ECJ and its Advocate 
General concurred in the conclusion. They differed, however, significantly and illuminatingly, 
in the reasoning upon which they base this conclusion. They share the same quandary in 
their responses to the true conflict underlying the controversy between the two neighbours: 
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Austria, after a referendum held in  1978, committed in its constitution to  the rejection  of 
atomic  energy  and  confirmed  it  position  by  an  unanimous  parliamentary  vote  in  1997. 
Austria‘s neighbours are not entitled to reverse this position. On the other hand, Austria must 
not impose its views in its neighbours. 
VI.2.2   Administrative Suprantionalism in the ECJ’s Grand Chambre  
When confronted with the differences between Austria and the Czech Republic, the ECJ 
started to search for a resolution at a higher legal level. That search, however, did not lead to 
conclusive  results.  True,  the  EAEC  Treaty  of  1957,  in  its  Title  II,  contains  ―provisions 
designed to encourage progress in the field of nuclear energy‖. Neither this Treaty nor any 
other provision of European law does grant the competence ―to authorise the construction or 
operation of nuclear installations‖.
146 All that Articles 30-31 EAEC provide for are procedures 
for  the  coordination  of  national  standards  for  the  protection  of  dangers  from  ionising 
radiation.
147 The gap between these Articles remains puzzling. The way out  of this dilemma 
which the ECJ takes is troubling: The principle of prohibition of discrimination on grounds of 
nationality precludes, so the ECJ explains, legislation of a Member State under which an 
undertaking in possession of the necessary official aut horisations for operating a nuclear 
power plant situated in the territory of another Member State may be the subject of an action 
for an injunction. Then follows a concession: It is for the national court to give, in so far as 
possible, to the domestic legislation which it must apply an interpretation which complies with 
the requirements of Community law. In the last instance, however, the national court is 
bound to protect the rights which Community law confers on individuals‖.
148 
VI.2.3 AG Poiares Maduro’s Flirt with Conflicts Law 
The Opinion which AG Maduro delivered to the Court on 22 April 2009 is indefinitely more 
elegant.  Maduro  does  not  seek  an  escape  route  to  public  law  of  spurious  supranational 
validity. The way he frames the problématique is a variant of the ―argument from external 
effects‖: 
This  case  may  be  characterised  as  one  which  turns  on  the  question  of  reciprocal 
externalities. On the one side, Austria and, in particular, the Land Oberösterreich believe 
they are victims of an externality imposed on them by ČEZ and the Czech authorities in 
installing a nuclear power plant next to the Austrian border without taking into account the 
risks imposed on those living on the other side of the border. On the other side, ČEZ and the 
Czech  Republic  argue  that  it  is  the  interpretation  of  Austrian  law  made  by  the  Austrian 
Supreme Court that imposes on them an externality by requiring them to close the Czech 
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nuclear power plant simply to protect the interests of Austrian citizens and without taking into 
account the situation in the Czech Republic.
149 
Not only the diagnosis, but also the suggested therapy is very much in line with the conflicts -
law approach. Maduro defines the law‘s proper objective as 
making national authorities, insofar as is possible, attentive to the impact of their decisions 
on the interests of other Member States and their citizens since this goal can be said to be at 
the core of the project of European integration and to be embedded in its rules.
150 
He arrives at his solution in two bold steps . The first is an upgrading of the economic 
freedoms which he had already prepared in his Ph.D., and later on famously developed 
further.
151 Maduro transforms the ―argument from external effects‖ into a legal duty to respect 
the extra-territorial interests of economic actors: 
[T]he rules of free movement aim at eliminating any restriction imposed by a Member State 
on economic activity in or with another Member State. A cross-border element is required but 
that cross-border element does not need to involve an actual hindrance of free movement 
from or to the State imposing the measure. It is sufficient that the extraterritorial application 
of that State measure may affect economic activity in another Member State or between 
other Member States.
152 
This move implies that it is up to Austria to justify the impact of its restrictive views on the 
Czech Republic. In this respect, he seems to proceed more subtly than the ECJ. The duty to 
take the impact of Austrian decisions on its neighbours into account is indeed an im plication 
of  the  ―argument  from  external  effects‖.  It  is  also  worth  noting  that  the  AG  does  not 
camouflage  the  lacunae  of  European  law  in  the  present  constellation.
153  That argument, 
however, works both ways. The Czech Republic must take the concerns of its  neighbours 
seriously. This is precisely the type of ―true‖ conflict which should according to the conflicts of 
law‘s theory of the American conflicts scholar Brainerd Currie by a higher legislative authority 
(by  Congress  in  the  American  federal  system).
154  AG  Maduro  does  not  refer  to  such 
theorising but he is perfectly aware of the problématique to which Brainerd Curie responded 
in such an uncomfortable way. He implicitly subscribes to the ―true conflict‖ analysis with his 
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notion of ―reciprocal externalities‖
155 – and then seeks to forego Currie‘s non possumus in a 
search for a reconciliation of both concerns:  
In balancing the achievement of public policy goals, such as protection of human health and 
property  rights,  with  the  restriction  of  rights  protected  by  Article  43  EC  and  other  free 
movement  provisions  which  a  refusal  to  recognise  a  Czech  authorisation  will  entail,  the 
Austrian court must take account of the fact that Community law specifically authorises the 
development of nuclear installations and the development of nuclear industries in general. It 
must also give weight to the fact that the authorisation granted to the Temelín facility by the 
Czech authorities was granted in accordance with the standards established by the relevant 
Community law.
156 
The first step in the argument sounds nothing but logical, the second, however, is not easily 
to reconcile with the AG‘s observation that ―the EAEC rules are only aimed at regulating the 
conditions  under  which  a  nuclear  facility  should  be  authorised  to  operate‖.
157  It  is  by  no 
means clear why such regulations should trump Austria‘s constitutionalised no to Atomic 
energy. The democracy gap which we have observed in the ECJ‘s labour law jurisprudence 
re-surfaces again and the answers remain unsatisfactory. The non-discrimination principle 
alone must not outrule Austria‘s principled objections against nuclear energy. The economic 
freedoms which the Treaty grants to Czech citizens must not trump the political rights of 
Austrian citizens. This constellation is even more intricate than the conflicts between national 
labour law and European freedoms. There, we have argued that European law would be well 
advised  to  respect  national  welfare  traditions.  This  type  of  solution  is  unavailable  in  the 
present conflict. European law can neither legitimise nor prohibit nuclear energy. One may 
argue that de facto irrevocable decisions like that on atomic energy should never be taken. 
But such a normative argument must not be transformed into a legally-binding decision by 
judicial fiat. At the end of the day, GA Maduro, but equally the ECJ, gave the only possible 
answer to an irresolvable problématique. 
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VII.   The “Geology” of Contemporary Law and the Project of 
a Three-dimensional Conflict s Law 
―Unity in Diversity‖, unitas in pluralitate, the motto of the Constitutional Treaty, transposes the 
European ambitions and perspectives of the conflicts-law approach. Neither the significance 
of this motto, nor its translation into the language and proceduralising methodology of the 
conflicts-law approach are confined to Europe‘s postnational constellation. The need to cope 
with conflicting policies and to ensure the legitimacy of their ―weight‖ and co-ordination is 
present at all levels of governance, in the international system as well as within constitutional 
democracies. At all levels, this problématique has provoked a turn to ―proceduralisation‖, and 
fostered the insight that legal decision-making cannot be deductive, but must be constructive 
and must derive its legitimacy from the quality of the procedures guiding its decision-making 
processes. The identification of this problématique at all levels of governance and in the 
―diagonal conflicts constellations‖ between them, which multi-level constellations generate, is 
just one message of the conflicts-law approach, which these concluding remarks wish to 
underline.  Equally  important  is  a  second  message  which  requires  a  three-dimensional 
differentiation of the conflicts-law approach. The title of this section alludes to this second 
message. ―Geology‖ is a term borrowed from Joseph Weiler, who introduced it to explain 
transformations  of  international  law  of  paradigmatic  importance.
158  ―International  law  as 
Regulation‖  is  a  notion  which  he  contrasts  with  ―international  law  as  Transaction‖  and 
―international law as Community‖. It represents ―a new mode of international law, specific in 
its normativity and legitimacy‖. This latter insight corresponds to the grand debates on the 
new functions and normative qualities of the law of post-laissez faire welfare states, which 
dominated the agenda of the pre- and post-1968 generations. 
VII.1.  Post-interventionist  Law  and  the  Turn  to  Regulation  and 
Governance 
These two generations witnessed, or participated in, two big waves of theorising. The first 
wave was preoccupied with the social deficits and methodological flaws of ―legal formalism‖; 
the replacement of formalism by substantive rationality criteria was the slogan of the day.
159 
―Law as regulation‖ was not the then prevailing terminology; substantive rationality was to be 
carried into law through ―interventionism‖. As all this did not really work out, a second wave 
of  theorising  was  initiated:  substantive  rationality  was  replaced  by  post-interventionist 
                                                       
158  J.H.H.  Weiler,  ―The  Geology  of  International  Law  –  Governance,  Democracy  and  Legitimacy‖,  (2004)  64 
Heidelberg Journal of International Law (ZaöRV), pp. 547-562, at 552. 
159 See Ch. Joerges, ―Politische Rechtstheorie and Critical Legal Studies: Points of Contacts and Divergencies‖, in: 
idem & D. M. Trubek (eds), Critical Legal Thought: An American-German Debate (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1989), pp. 
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programming, in particular through reflexive law and the quest for a proceduralisation of the 
category of law.
160 
These moves sought to come to grips with the law‘s assumption of, and involvement in, ever 
new tasks and problem-solving activities. The search for post-interventionist programming 
(―governance structures‖ is the now widely-used term) and legal methodologies sought – or 
should have sought – to reconcile the erosion of formerly ―conditional‖ legal programmes 
with the legacy of the rule of law and the idea of law-mediated legitimacy of democratic rule. 
Nobody has characterised this new challenge as pointedly as Rudolf Witethölter in one of his 
early  essays:  ―Purposive  programming‖  is  the  living  law  and  legal  conditio  sine  qua  non 
(Lebenselexier) of modern democracies, he wrote back in 1973
161 and complemented this 
message in 1977 through the discovery of the affinities or structural analogies with conflict of 
laws.
162 In the meantime, he had already proclaimed the need for a ―proceduralisation of the 
category of law‖.
163 
Practice, sociological research and theoretical reflections did not come to a standstill. We 
have,  for  many  years  now,  accustomed  ourselves  to  ever  more  sophisticated  regulatory 
programming  and  we  have,  more  recently,  witnessed  a  turn  to  ―governance‖,  a  notion 
encompassing  a  grand  variety  of  widely-used  co-operative  arrangements  between 
governmental and non-governmental actors. There is no space and no need to elaborate on 
all this here. The only observation to be underlined concerns the structural parallels in the 
national and the postnational constellations. The geology which Joseph Weiler has depicted 
in  international  law  can  be  observed  at  all  levels,  even  within  constitutional  law.  Parallel 
structures generate similar challenges. Regulatory politics need to be institutionalised and 
governance arrangements established within the European Union and beyond its ―borders‖. 
The  practical  and  challenges  and  normative  problem  that  these  developments  pose, 
however, vary considerably. 
                                                       
160 See Ch. Joerges, ibid., p. 626 et seq., and previously G. Brüggemeier & Ch. Joerges, ―Workshop zu Konzepten 
des postinterventionistischen Rechts‖, Zentrum für Europäische Rechtspolitik, Materialien 4, Bremen 1984. 
161 See his  Rechtswissenschaft in Kritik und als Kritik (Critique of legal science and legal science as critique), 
(Mainz: Universitätschriften, 1973), available at:   http://www.jura.uni-
frankfurt.de/l_Personal/em_profs/wiethoelter/RWTexte/KritikalsRecht_Sonderdruck.pdf. 
162 R Wiethölter, ―Begriffs- oder Interessenjurisprudenz – Falsche Fronten im IPR und Wirtschaftsverfassungsrecht: 
Bemerkungen  zur  selbstgerechten  Kollisionsnorm‖,  in:  A.  Lüderitz  et  al.  (eds)  Festschrift  für  Gerhard  Kegel, 
(Frankfurt  aM:  Metzner,  1977),  pp.  213-263.  G.  Teubner,  ―Dealing  with  Paradoxes  of  Law:  Derrida,  Luhmann, 
Wiethölter‖, in: O. Perez & G. Teubner (eds), Paradoxes and Inconsistencies in the Law, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2005), pp. 41-64; partisan positions are cited there in note 5; to be added to this list is now G. Conway, ―Values and 
Conflicts of Norms in EU Law‖, (note 107 supra), Chapter 1 and passim. 
163 ―Materialization and Proceduralization in Modern Law‖, in: G. Teubner (ed),  Dilemmas of Law in the Welfare 
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VII.2.  The Need for a Three-dimensional Conflicts Law 
Throughout the preceding sections, we have dealt with primary and secondary European 
law,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  legal  systems  of  the  Member  States,  on  the  other.  The 
sociological  background  analytics,  the  normative  premises  of  the  doctrinal  fabric  of  the 
conflicts approach can, quite plausibly, claim to capture the distinctiveness of the EU multi-
level system and its vertical, horizontal and diagonal conflicts adequately. With regard to the 
latter, it should have become particularly apparent why the conflicts-law approach cannot be 
reduced to the choice of a particular legal order. However, European conflicts law is also 
distinct in the conceptualisation of ―vertical‖ and ―horizontal‖ conflicts. Its rules and principles 
are supranationally valid, and, in this respect, stronger than the legal regimes established by 
international law; equally unique is the degree to which European law has transformed the 
comitas among Member States into binding legal-commitments.
164 This conflicts-law system, 
however, is by no means comprehensive. The structural reasons have just been addressed: 
the transformations which have occurred at national level in the turn to regulation and 
governance are also under way in the EU and in the international system. 
Regulatory  politics  in  the  European  Union  h ave  led  to  the  establishment  of  complex 
transnational non-legislative quasi-administrative regimes, which we have characterised as a 
second  dimension  of  conflicts  law.  It  responds  to  the  irrefutable  need  to  accompany  the 
Europeanisation  of  the  economy  by  transnational  regulatory  politics  which  must  operate 
outside the administrative-law frameworks which nation states have at their disposal. These 
need have triggered the co-operation of national bureaucracies with networks of epistemic 
communities with the European Commission in the much criticised – but also much praised –  
comitology system, the establishment of ever more European agencies most of whom are 
without  genuine  decision-making  powers.  The  conflicts-law  approach  seeks,  here  too,  to 
defend the idea of the rule of law and law-mediated legitimacy. Its constitutional hopes and 
perspectives focus on the quality of transnational decisions-making and its anchoring in, and 
supervision by, democratically legitimated actors – hence, again, on a proceduralisation of 
law.
165 
The third dimension of conflicts law reacts to the ―privatisation‖ of regulative tasks and the 
development of new ―governance arrangements‖, which can also be observed at national 
level,  but  which  are,  unsurprisingly,  particularly  important  at  transnational  levels.
166  Any 
sharp differentiation between primarily administratively-anchored regulative forms with which 
the conflicts law of the second dimension is concerned from the primarily private regimes is 
not possible, because of the participation of expert communities and societal actors in both 
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supra), and Ch. Joerges, Three-dimensional Conflicts Law‖ (note 93 supra). 
165 See Ch. Joerges & M. Everson, ―Re-conceptualising Europeanisation as a public law of collisions: comitology, 
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of them. What the law needs to be concerned about, is the regulative function which both 
types exercise, and what it has to consider is its potential to ensure their legitimacy. The 
conflicts  law  approach  in  its  third  dimension  does  therefore  not  qualify  these  regimes 
complacently and without further ado as transnational ―law‖. Instead, it seeks to develop and 
promote the impact of normative yardsticks for their recognition by democratic legal orders; it 
furthermore builds upon the law‘s shadow, particularly the interests of non-statal orders in 
external  recognition  and  their  ensuing  readiness  to  subject  themselves  to  a  stringent 
procedural discipline.
167 
VII.3.  The Mandate of the ECJ in Conflicts Law Perspectives 
Critical  assessments  of  the  ECJ,  like  they  have  been  submitted  above,  are  apparently 
difficult to digest even in the relatively progressive law quarters of European law scholarship 
and  with  the  critics  stigmatised  as  ―enemies‖.
168  The  circle  of  potential  addresses  is 
widening. It not only includes political organisation such as trade unions, but may also be 
directed against those who argue that the ECJ operated outside good legal manners in the 
Mangold case,
169 and it without further ado included the German Constitutional Court after its 
pronouncements on the Treaty of Lisbon.
170 The discovery of such enemies may, however, 
signal more of a crisis of the Court and the Dominicans among its academic allies, than 
some malicious anti-European scepticism among its critics. It should be recalled that the first 
seminal  article  on  the  constitutionalising  activity  of  the  ECJ  has  explained  the  Court‘s 
success  by  the  fact  that  the  ECJ  operated  ―tucked  away  in  the  fairytale  Kingdom  of 
Luxembourg‖.
171 Eric Stein‘s most famous disciple has warned as early as 1994 that the 
―extended honeymoon‖ between the Court and its interlocutors may have come to an end.
172 
We know, indeed, too much about the context and the conditions which have fostered the 
broad  acceptance  of  the  Court‘s  jurisprudence  to  simply  assume  that  the  Courts 
performance and the Court‘s recognition by its interlocutors will remain stable.
173 
Should the impact of the ECJ have resulted from the trust in its non-partisan and the non-
political nature of its adjudication and the beneficial effects of these beliefs, the conflicts law 
approach has to plead guilty to the accusation of not respecting this fiction. This unmasking 
of what cannot be concealed anyway, builds upon both so many conclusive analyses of the 
                                                       
167 Thus is the conclusion of th extensive inquiries of H. Schepel, The Constitution of Private Governance: Product 
Standards in the Regulation of Integrating Markets, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 223. 
168  See  Franz  C.  Mayer,  ―Der  EuGH  als  Feind?  Die  Debatte  um  das  soziale  Europa  in  der  europäischen 
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169 See D. Grimm, ―Die große Karlsruher Verschiebung‖, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.09.2010, Nr. 209, p. 
8. 
170 Note 23 supra. 
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173 A. Vauchez, ―The transnational politics of judicialization. Van Gend en Loos and the making of EU polity‖‚ (2010) 
16 European Law Journal, pp. 1-28. 44 — Joerges  / Unity in Diversity — I H S 
 
 
ECJ in particular and the politicisation of the integration project as a whole.
174 The state of 
the Union is too critical and the integration project too precious to benefit from this type of 
critical exchange. Europe and its Court would deserve a more serious effort.  Lawyers and 
political  scientists  have  produced  very  strong  analyses  of  the  Court‘s  performance  and 
impact.
175  It is nevertheless stunnning to observe how cautious the  maîtres  penseurs  of 
constitutional and legal theory operate when it comes to define the theoretical basis and 
legitimate functions of the ECJ.
176 What these analyses do not include is a political theory of 
the kind and of the quality of the theorizing on constitutional courts and their legitimacy. The 
conflicts-law approach cannot claim to fill th is gap conclusively. The distinction, however, 
between the supervision of political powers within constitutional democracies, on the one 
hand, and the compensation of democracy failures of nation states by European law, on the 
other, should at least provide some new orientation for further research. 
 
 
                                                       
174 See the pathbreaking study by A-M. Burley (Slaughter) & W. Mattli, ―Europe before the Court: A Political Theory 
of Legal Integration‖, (1993) 47 International Organisation, pp. 41-76, and, for the politicization thesis, M. Zürn & M. 
Ecker-Ehrhardt  (eds),  Gesellschaftliche  Politisierung  und  internationale  Institutionen,  (Frankfurt  aM:  Suhrkamp; 
forthcoming).  
175 See, recently, K. Alter, The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 34 et seq. 
176 Suffice it to point here to M. Rosenfeld, ―Comparing constitutional review by the European Court of Justice and 
the U.S. Supreme Court‖, (2008) 4 International Journal of Constitutional Law, pp. 618-651; on p. 633, we read: ―In 
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